



# The Humanitarian Accountability Report 2006

# **The Humanitarian Accountability Report 2006**

**Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International**



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# Executive Summary

## Overview

*Highlights of the 2006 Humanitarian Accountability Report*

- *More optimism about accountability to disaster survivors*
- *Efforts to improve accountability continue*
- *Some good practices reported*
- *85% of HAP Secretariat Workplan completed*
- *82% of HAP Secretariat budget spent*
- *96% of HAP Secretariat revenue budget received/pledged*
- *Field support delivered in Aceh, Pakistan and Sudan*
- *HAP's Medium Term Strategic Plan approved*
- *Draft Accountability Standard delivered to the Board*
- *Unforeseen complexities of the Standard project affected other areas of the Secretariat Workplan*

## Structure of the Report

The 2006 Humanitarian Accountability Report is divided into three sections. The first part offers an overview of progress achieved and challenges experienced in improving humanitarian accountability across the whole sector in 2006. An independent observer wrote this section following the methodology used in the 2005 Humanitarian Accountability Report. It includes the results of a survey of perceptions of humanitarian

accountability in 2006. The second part contains the annual report of the HAP Secretariat, which is presented in relation to the objectives and activities set out in the Secretariat's 2006 Workplan<sup>1</sup>. The third section is an unedited compilation of the members' 2006 annual humanitarian accountability implementation reports, most of which were presented to the HAP General Assembly in April 2007.

## Humanitarian Accountability Across the Sector

While the accountability of humanitarian agencies may have improved in 2006, many disaster survivors may not have noticed the difference. Agencies remained concerned about quality, as the humanitarian sector recognized a persistent failure to put principles into practice. Humanitarian efforts to provide quality and accountability also remained constrained by external factors, such as insecurity and politics. A range of better and worse accountability practices were documented. Participation was perceived to be the best way to provide accountability to disaster survivors, particularly in combination with other methods.

### The HAP Secretariat

In 2006 HAP's work was not hampered by financial constraints, as revenues from donors and members met 93% of the expenditure budget, with a further 3% of pledged funding expected in early 2007. Earmarked income for HAP's field support operations, amounting to 17% of total income, covered 87% of field expenditure, demonstrating robust financial backing of HAP's policy of maintaining a flexible field support capacity.

The HAP Secretariat completed 85% of the activities of the 2006 Secretariat workplan with expenditure of 82% of the planned budget of CHF 1.97 million.

The HAP Secretariat delivered field support in Aceh, Pakistan and Sudan, although a joint mission to Liberia with ICVA/Building Safer Organisations to review progress in the prevention of sexual exploitation and gender-based violence did not take place.

In April the General Assembly approved the HAP Medium Term Strategic Plan<sup>2</sup> (2007-2009), based upon widespread consultation with HAP's stakeholders. The Plan resolved key issues concerning the development of HAP's certification scheme and confirmed the direction set out in "Accreditation: the Way Forward<sup>3</sup>" that envisages progress towards realising HAP's vision being achieved through certification franchises awarded to competent NGO networks.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix 1

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.hapinternational.org/pdf\\_word/720-HAP-MediumTermStrategic%](http://www.hapinternational.org/pdf_word/720-HAP-MediumTermStrategic%)

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.hapinternational.org/en/complement.php?IDcomplement=65&IDcat=10&IDpage=73>

For the HAP Secretariat, much of 2006 was dominated by the demands of the Standard development project. Although this has proven to be a more complex process than first thought, the delivery to the Board of the final draft of the HAP 2007 Standard in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management represented the culmination of an exercise first initiated in mid-2004. The draft HAP Standard was the tangible outcome of consultations that embraced all of HAP's stakeholders in a process that meets ISO's very demanding criteria for the development of an international quality standard.

Most of those activities in the 2006 workplan not completed on schedule have been temporarily deferred rather than cancelled. These delays were caused by a variety of reasons described in more detail below. The most significant, the publication of the HAP Manual of Accountability originally scheduled for distribution in December 2006, resulted from unforeseen complexities in managing the consultation process and building consensus around the Standard. As the finalisation of the HAP Standard is also an essential milestone on the critical path for commissioning the HAP certification scheme, for compliance monitoring, for complaints handling, and for implementing the research strategy, progress in all of these areas has been held back. Indirectly, all of the Secretariat's activities have been affected, mainly as a result of HAP staff taking on various leadership and executive duties that had been envisaged as forthcoming from member agencies as part of their expected contribution to the standard development process, but which failed in some cases to materialise.

By most conventional measures, the HAP Secretariat enjoyed an outstandingly successful year in 2006. HAP did almost everything that it said it would do. The draft Standard was completed, field support operations made solid progress and donors made it all possible. The strategic planning process dispelled much of the fog surrounding the medium term future of HAP.



# 1. Humanitarian Accountability in 2006<sup>4</sup>

## 1 Key Findings

- The sector was more optimistic about the prospects for improving humanitarian accountability in 2006, but accountability to disaster survivors still lagged behind accountability to other stakeholders
- Evidence from reviews published in 2006 were consistently critical of the accountability of the humanitarian sector in general while noting that some agencies had made progress
- Calls for more robust forms of agency regulation and programme quality assurance arose from studies and reviews of the December 2005 Asian tsunami response although there was little consensus on the details of such schemes
- Work by inter-agency initiatives to develop standards and implement good practice in accountability and quality management continued

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<sup>4</sup> This chapter was written by Andrew Lawday, an independent consultant. The report represents the views of the author, and these are not necessarily shared by HAP.

## 1.1 Introduction

### *Background*

The founders of HAP envisioned a humanitarian system that champions the rights and dignity of disaster survivors. The partnership was formed in 2003 to “*make humanitarian action accountable to intended beneficiaries through self-regulation and compliance verification.*”

HAP published its first *Humanitarian Accountability Report* in May 2006, intended as a ‘progress report’ on accountability and quality management across the humanitarian sector in 2005. The study found that the sector widely acknowledged a humanitarian accountability deficit; that many relief agencies and donors worked through initiatives to improve quality and accountability; and that some agencies developed accountable practices. It also noted that overall accountability to beneficiaries was perceived as weak, and that evidence of progress was patchy.

The humanitarian community, during 2006, continued to respond to disasters and conflicts, assisting millions of people worldwide. The community also began implementing the UN-led humanitarian reform programme, contemplated findings from in-depth multi-stakeholder studies of the December 2005 Asian tsunami response, and worked collaboratively to address long-standing weaknesses and challenges.

What progress was detectable in the accountability and quality of humanitarian action during 2006? What evidence was there of better accountability in practice, or otherwise? What progress could be expected in 2007?

### *Methodology*

To address such questions, HAP commissioned an independent consultant to review progress made towards strengthening accountability norms and practices in the humanitarian sector during 2006. Evidence was sought through the administration of the second HAP humanitarian accountability perceptions survey and a review of key documents published during 2006.


The first humanitarian accountability perceptions survey was conducted in March 2006 and its results were published in the 2005 Humanitarian Accountability Report. The second survey was sent out in March 2007 to HAP’s email contacts (for further details see Appendix 1) to gauge opinions on system-wide progress in humanitarian accountability achieved during 2006. In total, 165 responses were received, from senior managers (33%), programme managers (28%) and policy advisers (21%). Most respondents (58%) worked for international NGOs, and some two-thirds lived in donor countries or aid headquarters. Responses therefore represented the views of people likely to be aware of HAP and to hold positions of authority in the humanitarian system.

The documentation review included the selection and review of relevant policy reports published in 2006. The reports were selected from ReliefWeb, or obtained from quality and accountability initiatives, for their perceived relevance to humanitarian accountability. They reflected concerns of the sector (TEC, NGO Impact Initiative, ALNAP/RHA, IASC), researchers (ODI, Tufts), agencies (OCHA, Oxfam, Care, Save the Children) and one donor (DFID). Three studies proved most relevant: the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition's *Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report*; the NGO Impact Initiative's *An Assessment by the International Humanitarian NGO Community: Synthesis Report*; and ALNAP's *Review of Humanitarian Action in 2005*.<sup>5</sup>

## 1.2 Survey finds growing optimism

A large majority (75%) of respondents to HAP's survey of humanitarian accountability in 2006 perceived that agencies were becoming 'more accountable' to disaster survivors (see table 1). This result contrasts favourably with findings in 2006, when respondents cited 'mild improvement' in accountability to intended beneficiaries in 2005 and predicted little improvement in 2006.


**Table 1.** Agencies are becoming more accountable to disaster survivors



Notwithstanding these advances the HAP survey found that humanitarian accountability in 2006 was still perceived as 'low' to disaster survivors; 'medium-low' to host government authorities; 'medium' to private donors; and 'high' to official donors. These responses were comparable with the first HAP Survey, and supported a similar conclusion: A large majority of respondents believed that intended beneficiaries experienced the greatest deficit in humanitarian accountability. Therefore, capacity to demand accountability appeared to correlate directly with the relative power of stakeholders.

<sup>5</sup> See References and Further Reading at the end of this section for a full list of documents consulted. The main constraint on the document review was the limited time available for the study.

**Table 2.** Rating of humanitarian accountability by stakeholder group



### 1.3 A “chorus of criticism” about...

In spite of the optimism captured by the HAP perceptions survey, the documents reviewed told a less positive story. NGOs, UN agencies and donors were all cited in a veritable chorus of criticism about the weakness of the humanitarian system’s accountability to crisis-affected persons.

#### NGOs

In practice, NGOs often did not provide enough accountability to beneficiaries. Opinion surveys, an important tool for strengthening accountability to beneficiaries, were rarely used. Accountability to donors took precedence over accountability to beneficiaries, and uncertainty about the relationship between ‘accountability to donors’ and ‘accountability to beneficiaries’ pulled agencies in different directions (ALNAP: Vaux p80, pp49-50 and p75). For example, food-aid was often preferred to cash because the humanitarian system “*only weakly reflects the notion of accountability to beneficiaries*” (ALNAP:Vaux p59). NGOs were unwilling to publish and disseminate evaluations. It was “a matter of concern” that relatively few organisations actively disseminated their evaluations, and a “very low” proportion of NGO (and Red Cross) evaluations were published compared to those of donors and UN agencies (ALNAP: Vaux:p38). Poor accountability also increased risks of corruption, since beneficiaries and their representatives are best placed to recognise and fight corruption at the local level (ODI/corruption p15). In the tsunami response, generous public funding had in some cases actually discouraged humanitarian actors from prioritising accountability to affected populations (NGO Impact Initiative p21). A Tearfund representative told UK parlia-

mentarians “*Downwards accountability to affected communities remains extremely weak, despite there being a direct correlation between this type of accountability and the quality of work*” (House of Commons p50). Though NGOs had led the way in developing a stronger framework to define ethical and professional standards for their humanitarian work in the 1990s, there was uneven adherence to these principles in operations (DFID, p16).

## United Nations Agencies

In 2006, the United Nations humanitarian reform efforts appeared scarcely concerned with turning stated commitments to being accountable to disaster survivors into practical reality. Despite promises made by the ERC<sup>6</sup> and expressed in the Humanitarian Response Review, reports on the Cluster Approach did not explicitly mention accountability to people affected. By December, the IASC called yet again for the “identification of tools to promote greater system-wide accountability to affected populations” (OCHA reform; Dec 06). The UN-led system for protecting and assisting displaced people also seemed far from accountable. While donors had raised important concerns about the effectiveness of responses to refugee crises, the accountability agenda was not being driven by humanitarian principles and the needs of displaced persons (HCR/SOWR: p100-101). UNHCR’s internal accountability mechanisms offered neither adequate sanctions nor remedies when fundamental rights of refugees and stateless persons had been directly violated by UNHCR. With UNHCR constantly making decisions that affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of displaced people, there was “*a real and vital need for the organization to be more accountable to its beneficiaries*” (HCR/SOWR p186-187). Moreover, UNHCR, acting globally on behalf of vulnerable populations, appeared to be assuming more prerogatives to determine their interests (Pupavac p23).

## donors

Official donors remained accountable in few evident ways to people affected by disasters. Despite their Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles, donors unwittingly contributed to the disempowerment of less powerful stakeholders by placing excessive demands upon agencies’ accountability mechanisms (Stockton p35). The tsunami response demonstrated that the current international appeals system delivered funding that bore little correlation with real needs on a global level. Almost three years after the adoption of the GHD principles, this discrepancy illustrated the urgent need for external monitoring and control of donor accountability and performance. Self-regulation was clearly not working (TEC p97). The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness

<sup>6</sup> “We must improve, all of us, our own internal accountability systems as well as become fully accountable to the affected population and the public,” said Jan Egeland, Emergency Relief Coordinator, UNOCHA, Geneva, 14 July 2006; [http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/71DA971F-CDE7-4956-8EC9-5158C54BEDE7/0/egeland\\_transcript.pdf](http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/71DA971F-CDE7-4956-8EC9-5158C54BEDE7/0/egeland_transcript.pdf)

was criticised because it relied on self-assessment, and gave donors leeway in cases where they continued to provide poor quality aid (ActionAid p17). Sectoral and geographical allocation of contributions showed disparities in the responses to consolidated and flash appeals (UNJIU p. xii). Most donors did little to strengthen regulation and proved lax in delivering on their GHD pledges, especially with regard to promoting accountability to beneficiaries. Donors' increased demands for reporting and accountability, and their reluctance to accept the increased overheads that these imply, seemed a contradiction. For example, under-investment in staff development encouraged higher turnover. As a consequence, agencies still struggled to have people with the right competencies in the right place at the right time. (Locquercio et al: p7)

### **and the system at large**

International agencies' frequent failures in the modest objective of informing affected people in an accurate, timely, and comprehensive manner proved the biggest source of dissatisfaction, anger and frustration among affected people (TEC p10). 'Accountability reports' issued by individual agencies on the anniversary of the tsunami focused on brand promotion above accountability and transparency to both funding publics and affected people (TEC p57). The reports were self-laudatory or insubstantial; some were not officially released to the publics by whom they were funded and in whose name funds were solicited (TEC p78). Promoters of accountability and transparency inside agencies had to struggle against increasingly powerful press and communications departments, which argued that releasing information about agency problems and shortcomings could lead to unfavourable publicity and damage to the agency's brand (TEC p109).

A tense relationship between humanitarian actors and media also undermined transparency. The uneasy relationship resulted in less transparency and minimal downward accountability among many aid providers (U4/Media, pp17-18). Agencies were accountable to the press rather than to governments or to beneficiaries (U4/Media, p28). The tsunami case exposed a critical need to realign media-agency relations in a way that is conducive to greater accountability of aid – both to beneficiaries and to the public in donor countries (U4/Media, p5). For instance, donors could support local media in crisis-affected countries in efforts to contribute to accountability and transparency (U4/Media, p10).

Accountability and complaints mechanisms were initially established in only a few locations, were not commensurate with the scale of the funding, and were largely ineffective at addressing the worst cases of inappropriate aid, wastefulness and negligence (TEC p75). The ineffectiveness or absence of complaints mechanisms was a leading obstacle to receiving sexual exploitation and abuse allegations (Women's Commission p14). Accountability mechanisms for displaced people had to be strengthened (HCR/SOWR intro).

In sum, only a minority of evaluations identified improvements in performance (ALNAP/Sandison, p90), while concerns related to quality, participation and accountability continued to damage the reputation of disaster response agencies (TEC p78).

## 1.4 Plenty of advice offered to...

In the light of these observations, aid agencies were offered much advice about how to improve accountability to crisis-affected persons.

### NGOs

NGOs needed to promote accountability to affected populations at the field level, by ensuring that NGO project budgets include pertinent line items (NGO Impact Initiative, p7). People affected by disasters should be provided with information about the aid agency, the work it does, beneficiary entitlements and feedback (NGO Impact Initiative p15). NGOs ought to support established government accountability mechanisms wherever possible (NGO Impact Initiative p15). Strategies for retaining staff should be implemented by line managers and backed by senior management and all relevant departments (Locquercio et al: p11). A working group should be established among relevant humanitarian NGO platforms to launch a “consensus-building dialogue” around the adoption of a modest number of core operating standards. These would have to be developed and adopted before the implementation of a compliance enforcement mechanism; the “continuum” would include standards development, stakeholder validation, technical assistance, structured self-regulation, and then external verification – either by peer-review, second or third party auditing and accreditation (NGO Impact Initiative pp96-97)

### United Nations agencies

A UN review of the tsunami response recommended that the Secretary-General “*develop a set of compliance procedures that would enable Member States to monitor the performance and accountability*” of resident and humanitarian coordinators and related humanitarian agencies (UNJIU p16). The capacity of national oversight authorities in affected countries should be strengthened to provide accountability in the use of the funds raised for the benefit of affected populations (UNJIU: Recommendation 15 pxiii).

### donors

Donors should develop a collective performance framework in line with the full range of GHD principles (Graves p14). Donors should agree on a standard of indices of humanitarian need and thereby establish the prime basis for aid allocations and accountability (ALNAP, Vaux p79). Donors should support, in policy and in financing, INGO programmes focused on accountability to affected populations (NGO Impact Initiative p10). Donors should develop mechanisms such as accreditation to measure

the relative effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of international agencies, and fund accordingly (TEC p124).

### **and the system at large**

Aid agencies should empower people affected by disasters to articulate claims, make their own choices, and thereby demand accountability (TEC p113). Transparency should be strengthened through development of an aid principle based on the right to seek, receive and impart information. This would imply a responsibility to inform affected people in an accessible language – not just about performance standards, programmes and concerns or complaints mechanisms, but also about all significant aspects of programming, including budgets (TEC pp111-112). An audit approach would serve accountability better than the present identification of performance issues without a commitment to respond to the findings (ALNAP/Sandison, pp122, 96-97). The international relief system should establish an accreditation and certification system to distinguish agencies that work to a professional standard in a particular sector (TEC pp120-121).

## **1.5 Regulation still debated**

While several calls for greater regulation of the sector were made, some NGOs insisted that any regulation should be done by the sector – either individually by agencies or collectively among peers. The quality and accountability initiatives developed ‘by and for’ NGOs sought to hold humanitarian NGOs accountable to those structures and systems that they themselves defined as central to their work. But self-regulation had to be credible, as the NGO Impact Initiative study noted: “*INGOs must ... be willing to hold themselves accountable to the same high standards that they set for others. If not, the sector runs the very real risk that other stakeholders to humanitarian relief will establish their own criteria against which humanitarian NGOs will be judged*” (NGO Impact Initiative p97). This carefully worded caution reflected the widely held view that if self-regulation did not achieve results quickly, then statutory controls might follow instead.

However, some argued that it was already clear that agency self-regulation was not effective. The inter-agency quality and accountability initiatives were perceived to lack teeth, and most standards remained high-level principles without compliance mechanisms, third-party certification, or a critical mass of institutions able or willing to put them into practice (NGO Impact Initiative, p14). The Red Cross Code<sup>7</sup> had not been useful for NGOs seeking guidance vis-à-vis their actions and for purposes of accountability, and the large number of signatories (over 300) in the absence of a compliance mechanism may have undermined its integrity (Graves p10). The Code did not prescribe concrete institutional actions for implementation and against which to evaluate performance (Graves p.6).

<sup>7</sup> The *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Re-*

The experiences of existing NGO accountability systems had demonstrated that having established standards in place was not enough and that compliance review, verification and certification are needed (NGO Impact Initiative pp96-97). No agreement, however, was reached on who had the authority to monitor INGO compliance with standards. “Peer review” among NGOs was proposed as a way forward by the SCHR. Many argued forcefully that compliance enforcement should remain a matter of self-regulation within the sector. A “*formal, penalty-based regulation model*” of accountability in relation to GHD would be counter-productive at this stage (Graves p10). Others argued that peer review and self-regulation did not go far enough (NGO Impact Initiative pp96-97). The debate about regulation was clearly set to continue into 2007.

## 1.6 Substantive progress reported

As well as examining the challenges confronting the system, the documents reviewed also described some real progress made by humanitarian agencies in ensuring quality and accountability in their programmes.

Seven large NGOs continued their quest for “what works” in accountability to beneficiaries and agreed on Basic Elements of Accountability and Impact Measurement to guide their work. They developed a “How-To Guide” reflecting the “good enough” approach that stresses simple solutions and small steps toward accountability (ECB)<sup>8</sup>.

NGOs displayed increasing interest in improving recruitment, training and retention of staff. Some members of the Interagency Working Group on Emergency Capacity (IWG) used competency-based human resources (HR) management systems, which improved the sourcing, development and retention of quality staff (ECB pp32-33).

Some NGOs actively considered ways to improve implementation of their principles through collective self-regulation, using appropriate peer review mechanisms to comply with agreed standards of quality. NGOs participating in the NGO Impact Initiative committed to undertaking audits that will measure INGO accountability to local populations (NGO Impact Initiative/exec). A key step to improving their accountability was to “Know Where You Stand” by conducting an accountability audit of mechanisms for transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaints and response (NGO Impact Initiative p25).

HAP continued its work on developing the HAP Standard in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management through extensive consultations and field tests.

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<sup>8</sup> The Emergency Capacity Building Project, *About the Emergency Capacity Building Project's Accountability and Impact Measurement Initiative*  
<http://www.ecbproject.org/publications/ECB2/ECB2%20overview%20April%207%20'06.doc>

Some NGOs took further steps to become accountable to the populations they assist. Transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaints and response mechanisms were prioritised by many NGOs in the tsunami recovery effort (NGO Impact Initiative p2). Agencies responding to the tsunami showed a willingness to be transparent towards donors and beneficiaries. President Clinton, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for tsunami Recovery was "*singularly impressed with how forward-leaning NGOs have been in their willingness to be transparent and accountable about their tsunami recovery efforts.*"<sup>9</sup> Efforts to enhance local capacity aimed to ensure that affected populations were viewed as drivers of their own recovery (NGO Impact Initiative, p4). NGOs aided participation and contributed to equitable and inclusive provision of services in divided communities (NGO Impact Initiative, p16). Access to high-quality information enabled affected people to design their own coping and recovery strategies, make informed decisions and choices, and demand accountability (TEC p10). The international response was most effective when accountable to, enabling, facilitating and supporting those affected (TEC, p18).

The involvement of communities in targeting and monitoring aid distribution was an important way of ensuring transparency and accountability of delivery and of reducing aid diversion or theft (Oxfam, p11). In early 2006, Oxfam's Aceh programme found evidence of losses and announced it publicly; donors, partners and the international media welcomed such transparency (U4/Media p8).

Some humanitarian actors in the tsunami response provided complaints and response mechanisms. These mechanisms indicated that quality and accountability initiatives were influencing the sector (NGO Impact Initiative p15). Mechanisms employed during the tsunami response included complaint boxes in IDP camps, the formation of local complaints evaluation committees, and support for inter-agency mechanisms at local and district level (NGO Impact Initiative p19). Complaints mechanisms could readily be analysed in terms of direct cost and benefit (NGO Impact Initiative p19).

In 2006, the UN system began implementing a reform plan designed to strengthen humanitarian response capacity, reinforce the Humanitarian Coordinator System, and ensure predictable funding. The package was rolled out in Uganda, Somalia, DRC, and Liberia and also used in Pakistan, Lebanon, and Yogyakarta, Indonesia (OCHA reform/Mar 06). Elsewhere UNHCR instituted a system of refugee participation in some refugee camps and developed a Participatory Assessment Tool (IASC, p14 and p18).

Donors developed a collective performance measurement framework under the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative and tested indicators agreed in 2005 to monitor their collective progress. The indicators were measures of donor behaviour and were

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<sup>9</sup> Foreword by the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, (Clinton foreword)

directly attributable to donor action, even if they fell short of providing a complete means of assessing progress against all of the GHD principles – they relate only to financing and coordination - at a global level (Graves p8). One donor pledged to avoid unduly burdensome procedures in return for agencies' commitment to high levels of performance and improved accountability, including to intended beneficiaries, and to review procedures with its partners (DFID p6, p19).

Overall, the sector continued efforts to expand adherence to its principles and recognised professional standards.

## 1.7 Conclusion

Importantly, the challenges of humanitarian accountability must not obscure the achievements, “the millions of good things that humanitarian agencies do” (ALNAP p32). The UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery recognised that NGOs played “a critical role in helping to ensure there were temporary shelters and schools very early on in the relief effort and, most importantly, that starvation and widespread disease were avoided” (NGO Impact Initiative, foreword). Leadership at headquarters, regional and field levels was a crucial factor in the successful realisation of accountability (NGO Impact Initiative pp23-24).

Equally, humanitarians must not be held responsible where external factors constrained their ability to meet HAP’s accountability norms. In 2006, the sector continued to face complex political environments, and agencies were forced to deviate from good practices due to external political factors, insecurity, corruption, and rights violations, among others. So the system required a realistic appraisal of its current limits and the external pressures and internal weaknesses that continually compromise it (ALNAP, Slim p29). The application of humanitarian principles was more often thwarted in the outer realm of politics than in the inner realm of agency competence.

Although the sector continued efforts to strengthen adherence to its principles and professional standards, concerns about quality persisted during 2006. The humanitarian sector acknowledged its failure to put principles into practice and remained fraught with concerns about poor performance and unmet principles. Though NGOs were concerned that any regulation be done by the sector, some believed that agency regulation (through self-assessment) was not effective. The TEC called for a compliance mechanism, accreditation and certification, and the NGO Impact Initiative insisted on “consensus-building” around core operating standards. Meanwhile, the UN system began implementing a reform plan designed to strengthen humanitarian response capacity, and donors developed a collective performance measurement framework under the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.

While humanitarian accountability may have improved, and some NGOs took further steps to become accountable to the populations they assist, accountability to disaster survivors was still perceived as relatively 'low', and documentation suggested that NGOs did not provide enough accountability to beneficiaries in practice, with knock-on effects in terms of programme quality and impact. Meanwhile, the UN humanitarian reform efforts scarcely addressed accountability to people affected, donors remained accountable in few evident ways to intended beneficiaries, and disaster survivors lacked the means to demand accountability.

During 2006, humanitarian accountability may have improved; good practices were reported, and humanitarians seemed willing to improve their accountability further. Nonetheless, an overall picture emerges of a system that falls short in its accountability in practical terms to disaster survivors. Evaluations probably overstate the challenges and understate the successes, but a perception clearly exists among a range of important stakeholders that humanitarian action is not yet accountable enough.

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## 2. HAP in 2006

### 2.1 The HAP Secretariat Annual Report

The 2006 HAP Secretariat Annual Report follows the structure of the 2006 Workplan. This is reproduced in Appendix 1, with a column added that summarises the implementation status at year's-end for each of HAP's objectives and activities scheduled in 2006. Overall, 85% of the 2006 Workplan was completed with 82% of the planned budget expended. Explanations for activities that were deferred or cancelled are included in the relevant sections below.

### SECTION 1. Building our Programme

#### ► Objective 1.1 – Research

##### **Highlights**

- *Research strategy formulated*
- *Accountability literature survey drafted*
- *Survey of perceptions of accountability conducted*
- *Beneficiary and field practitioner survey conducted*
- *Field tests on draft Standard indicators conducted in Senegal, Somalia and Sri Lanka*
- *Feedback on draft Standard analysed*
- *Commissioned research projects deferred*

The HAP Researcher conducted a review of the existing accountability in aid literature and redesigned HAP's research agenda as subsequently set out in the 2007-2009 HAP Strategic Plan. Following this review, HAP's research focused on the "humanitarian business case": the balance between the time and resources spent on practicing accountability to beneficiaries and those spent on getting the job done safely and efficiently for all involved. The research strategy prioritised

- 1) small research projects to collect good practice
- 2) commissioned research projects on key questions
- 3) research as a support function to the programme areas of HAP

During 2006, HAP actually focused its entire research capacity on the third avenue: acting as a support function to the Standard Development Project (1.2 below). From May until December, the HAP Researcher worked under the auspices of the Standards Development Project, co-developing and analyzing consultation questionnaires with beneficiaries and field practitioners (103 respondents), helping with the good practices working group and assisting the regional consultation workshops. In coordination with the Standards Development Manager and a CARE Researcher, the Researcher facilitated the Standards Development Testing Phase by co-developing the methodology and testing materials. Four agencies carried out agency-led self-assessments, while three agencies volunteered for on-site field tests. The Researcher analyzed the data received from the field tests in order to make recommendations to the HAP Standards Development Manager, the HAP Secretariat and the Editorial Steering Committee in December 2006.

Concentration on the Standard development process ultimately displaced plans to commission other research as envisaged in the research strategy.

## ► Objective 1.2 – Standard Development Project

### **Highlights**

- *Held two Standard Development Editorial Steering Committee Meetings*
- *Held regional consultation meetings on the HAP Standard in Kenya and Bangladesh*
- *Convened special meetings on Complaints Handling (Copenhagen) and working with "implementing partners" (London)*
- *Conducted field tests on draft Standard in Senegal, Somaliland and Sri Lanka*
- *Published final draft HAP 2007 Standard on the web*
- *HAP Standard Implementation Guide drafted*
- *Assisted Emergency Capacity Building Project in developing the "Good Enough Guide"*

## The HAP Standard Development Progress Report

By the end of 2005, the purpose, structure and approach for development of the HAP Accountability Standard had been established. The HAP Standard was intended to enable good practices of humanitarian accountability and quality management to be validated in a transparent, consistent and cost-effective way. An Editorial Steering Committee (ESC), drawn from HAP's membership, other quality initiatives and the HAP Secretariat, was created to lead the process. The ESC met twice in 2006: the April meeting reviewed the first draft of the Standard and guided the planning of the testing phase, while the December meeting agreed a final draft of the Standard and recommended this to the HAP Board for adoption.

The ESC consisted of two elements. First, the Management ESC comprised HAP staff and specialist consultants hired to help with specific areas (e.g. certification system and audit guidelines). Monthly meetings were held to coordinate the development process. Second, the Advisory ESC included the management ESC, HAP Members, and interested non-members and consultants, including former and current beneficiaries and specialists who volunteered to support and advise the development process.

A much broader consultation process was facilitated through the creation of the Standard Development Reference Group involving over 200 individuals: members, interested non-members, humanitarian quality and accountability initiatives, independent consultants, beneficiary representatives, donors and interested UN agencies. The Reference Group was sub-divided into four working groups:

### **Working Group 1: “Project Scoping”**

The main tasks were: (a) to identify the basic values common to the humanitarian objectives of HAP members, and (b) to design a principled and context-sensitive approach to compliance exoneration. Individual consultations conducted by the HAP Director were held with all but one of the CEOs of the member agencies, and feedback on drafts was gained through e-mail discussions and the ESC meetings. The output from this group was the Humanitarian Covenant section of the Standard.

### **Working Group 2: “Good Practices”**

The main tasks were: (a) to identify good practices of humanitarian accountability and quality management, and (b) to draft organisational requirements (initially called indicators) to measure and monitor compliance with the benchmarks. Feedback and input was gained through:

- Preliminary interviews with beneficiaries and line managers (January to March)
- Complaints handling workshop (Copenhagen - April)
- Two regional standards development workshops (May and July)
- Two reference group feedback questionnaires (July and November)
- Four self-assessment field tests

- Three on-site field tests of the benchmarks and their requirements (Senegal with OFADEC in August; Somaliland with the Danish Refugee Council in October, Sri Lanka with World Vision International in October)
- ESC meetings (April and December)
- Ongoing e-mail feedback from the reference group

The group identified and drafted six benchmarks, considered their respective organisational requirements, and suggested means of verification. The group also worked closely with the Emergency Capacity Building Project in the design of the “Good Enough” guide for field practitioners.

*“Having even a draft Standard changed HAP’s way of working in 2006, as we were able to refer to practical benchmarks which others, and programme staff especially, could easily relate to. This marked a change in approach and reception for HAP staff, as we were now utilising a tool seen as more precise and practical than the Accountability Principles. The benchmarks also provided a much-needed ‘kick-start’ to members’ ways of thinking and working. After even a short glance, programme staff often became visibly more emotional, responding strongly whether positive or negative (but never indifferent). Finally, we had a tool that allowed humanitarian workers to gauge their own levels of accountability. Questions arose: Did we listen enough? Did we inform people meaningfully? Did that community really agree to our intervention?”*

*The reaction we got to the draft Standard allowed us to engage and challenge members more boldly. The fact that hundreds of people, including beneficiaries, had contributed to the draft Standard gave us the confidence and legitimacy to use the benchmarks assertively as a means to measure quality. Nevertheless, we continued to draw heavily on the Accountability Principles for our inspiration and for explaining where the Standard was derived from.”*

Zia Choudhury – HAP Membership Services Coordinator

### **Working Group 3: “Business (or cost-benefit) Case”**

The main task of group 3 was to examine the costs and benefits of implementing the benchmarks and their requirements, as identified by Working Group 2, and to review of the costs of verification. Feedback from this group was obtained through:

- A Workshop held in Geneva in April
- Four self-assessment field tests
- Three on-site field tests of the benchmarks and their requirements (detailed under Working Group 2 above)


The group, supported by the HAP Researcher, prepared a report analysing the feasibility, affordability and measurability of the draft Standard.

### Working Group 4: “Implementation”

The main tasks were:(a) to prepare a communication strategy for the promotion of the Standard, (b) to review publication options, and (c) to advise on the design and publication of the HAP Accountability Manual. A communications consultant was hired from September to support the implementation of the above tasks, most of which were scheduled to happen in 2007.

### The HAP Standard Development process meets ISO guideline

The HAP 2007 Standard in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management was prepared in a manner that met the ISO guideline for the development of international quality standards<sup>10</sup>. This required a process that involved all stakeholder groups, was voluntary, and which provided “industry-wide” global solutions.



### Whose Standard is it? Statistics: June 2005 to December 2006

Consultation Process	No.
1. Beneficiaries & field managers interviewed	103
2. Reference group members .....	216
3. Agencies in reference group .....	96
4. Feedback questionnaires returned .....	65
5. Participants at workshops:	
Complaints Handling .....	29
Standard Development Asia .....	35
Standard Development Africa .....	43
6. Consultancy meetings .....	7
7. Published versions of the Standard.....	9
8. ESC members:	
Agency Managers .....	17
Beneficiary Representatives .....	9

Other quality and accountability initiatives were involved in its development, and the HAP Standard actually encourages agencies to incorporate other relevant codes, guidelines, principles and standards into an accountability framework. However, the HAP Standard still focuses on accountability to disaster survivors and therefore on those quality management practices that will ensure accountability to beneficiaries in an affordable, practical and measurable manner.

<sup>10</sup> ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 – Rules for the structure and drafting of International Standards.

*“HAP’s founding objectives require it to ‘monitor and report on implementation of HAP International’s principles of accountability and to accredit its members accordingly’. In December 2004 the 2nd General Assembly acknowledged that the HAP Accountability Principles did not provide an equitable and viable way to distinguish between good and bad practices in humanitarian programme management, and that a Standard needed to be developed in order that HAP could carry out its monitoring and compliance verification functions. But who has the authority to define good practice? Should it be the donors? Should it be governments?”*

*While both have a right to a say, those best placed to know what the standard are surely those who work in the sector and, more importantly, those in need of humanitarian assistance. HAP therefore chose to develop a standard in humanitarian accountability and its related quality management system by consulting with these stakeholders as the primary sources of experience and wisdom. In answer to the question, “whose Standard is it?”; we can say in all honesty that the HAP 2007 Standard was developed, with the help of disaster survivors, by the sector and for the sector.”*

Sheryl Haw – HAP Standards Development Manager

For the HAP Secretariat, the specialist consultants and the hundreds of volunteers involved in developing the final draft of the Standard, 2006 ended in a state of anticipation concerning the imminent review of the draft Standard by the HAP Board, scheduled for 30 January 2007.

## ► Objective 1.3 – New Emergencies Policy

### **Highlights**

- *Liberia – no field deployment, but...*
- *Kashmir Earthquake Field Support Project*
- *Darfur Field Support Projects*

### **Liberia**

HAP’s “New Emergencies Protocol<sup>11</sup>”, was only invoked once in 2006, namely in response to a study published in May by Save the Children UK that found *“the exploitation of children by humanitarian workers, peacekeepers and local businessmen to be prolific<sup>12</sup>”*.

<sup>11</sup> HAP’s “New Emergencies Policy” commits member agencies to review options for collective action on strengthening accountability in new emergency situations. The New Emergencies Protocol (revised November 2005) sets out the procedure for implementing the policy. See <http://www.hapinternational.org/en/complement.php?IDcomplement=64&IDcat=10&IDpage=73> for details.

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.savethechildren.org/newsroom/2006/children-in-liberia-victims.html>

In cooperation with “Building Safer Organisations (BSO)”, an ICVA-hosted project founded to build capacity to investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and gender-based violence, the HAP Secretariat convened a series of discussions with member agencies to consider whether a joint response was appropriate. While there was widespread support for a joint HAP/BSO mission to visit Liberia, there was much debate about the terms of reference and the composition of the proposed mission. When these matters were resolved, the preferred members of the team were no longer available, in one case because the member agency concerned felt that the mission was unlikely to make a valid contribution to existing measures to address the issue, and in the second case for personal reasons. As a consequence, the mission was not undertaken.

However, two positive outcomes resulted from this otherwise inconclusive initiative. First, the very fact that HAP and ICVA proposed a monitoring mission is reported to have intensified a sense of urgency amongst agencies working in Liberia to reassess their IASC “guidelines”<sup>13</sup> implementation practices. Second, ICVA and HAP agreed that a HAP-BSO merger would make excellent strategic sense. The Boards of HAP and ICVA formally approved the transfer of BSO to HAP in October, with an implementation date of April 2007.

On a less positive note, the HAP Secretariat and BSO noted with dismay how the “story” provoked by the Save the Children report seemed to die very quickly in the mainstream media in contrast to the more sustained coverage given to the 2001 Save-UNHCR report.

## Pakistan

Since November 2005, HAP has maintained a field support team in Pakistan hosted by World Vision Pakistan. The HAP team, funded by DFID, Tearfund, Oxfam GB and Care, engaged some members more than others. The team, based in Islamabad, travelled extensively throughout the affected areas. Increasing numbers of requests were made for HAP to support, assess and evaluate members’ staff and programmes. The HAP team oriented and trained hundreds of individuals, facilitated four thematic workshops and a TOT for programme staff. Feedback from participants was generally positive. The team also produced a video documentary, posters, leaflets and a “street-play”.

The HAP team measured their progress based on agreed outputs, but also on changes in HAP member behaviour and practice. The HAP team noted increasing awareness of quality and accountability issues amongst the staff of member agencies. Many members were active in developing tools and strategies to improve their work<sup>14</sup>. New, innovative

<sup>13</sup> Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings - Focusing on Prevention of and Response to Sexual Violence in Emergencies – IASC September 2005

<sup>14</sup> SPHERE, ECB, Red-R and others also contributed to training, supporting and engaging NGOs in quality and accountability issues.

and practical steps were taken by some members to set up better information and feedback systems. Others ensured that resources were allocated for recruiting dedicated quality and accountability staff, and some measured their own performance by using beneficiary feedback more meaningfully. It must be noted that after an initial involvement two members chose not to avail themselves of support from the HAP team on the grounds that the service on offer was not seen to be useful or appropriate at that time. The HAP Director consulted all members in Islamabad in November and concluded that in future field support operations a formal request to monitor compliance with the Accountability Principles should be made to members.

### **Some signs of impact**

No systematic research was carried out to examine whether beneficiaries felt that they had received a better quality service due to HAP's members adopting more accountable practices. This is an area HAP and its members need to develop in future. However, there was plenty of evidence<sup>15</sup> that, where members made a special effort to listen to earthquake survivors and to provide them with feedback opportunities, beneficiaries' perceptions of the relevant NGO and its aid services had improved.

Factors contributing to the success of the HAP Pakistan project included: an established HAP presence soon after the emergency; constructive support from donors, media and earthquake survivors for better quality services; and flexible and creative support to members with a good mix of bespoke and generic services. Challenges included: competing priorities and pressures within member agencies; reluctance or hesitation amongst members to allocate adequate resources and time to accountability issues; lack of guidance and support for members' from their HQs; initial lack of members' awareness of their institutional commitments to HAP; and high turnover of management staff.

The HAP team in Pakistan were also pioneering this type of intervention, with no in-house precedents from which to draw lessons<sup>16</sup>. The team were often demoralised by the lack of engagement from some Members and also by the enormous challenge that HAP has been set. The HAP Secretariat learnt that much more effort was required to bring together staff working on various HAP projects and that field teams require more consistent support and guidance from the Secretariat.

The greatest endorsement of the Pakistan project came when several members and other interested parties objected to the planned closure of the operation in November.

<sup>15</sup> See HAP website for examples of beneficiaries' testimonies and members' case studies.

<sup>16</sup> The review of the ALNAP Learning Support Office in Malawi (2002-3) offers useful lessons in the potential pitfalls of this sort of approach.

Members backed up their request with offers of funding and hosting support, and as a consequence the HAP Pakistan Phase II project was expected to commence in 2007.

## **Darfur – Sudan**

After the difficult start described in the 2005 annual report, HAP finally deployed an accountability advisor, hosted by Tearfund, from January 2006. In June two field officers and two support staff were recruited. The Advisor was based in Khartoum, whilst the field officers lived in Nyala. All the programme staff travelled throughout Darfur, offering support to member agencies. The original project objectives were revised in June 2006, after it became apparent that demand for the services of the project was lower than originally anticipated, due chiefly to unusually high staff turnover in member agencies combined with highly complex travel and security restrictions. The main service provided was the orientation and training of over 300 staff at both field and main offices, conducted through 34 sessions over a 6-month period.

The project raised awareness of accountability issues and the HAP Principles and also encouraged field staff to take simple measures to improve their accountability to beneficiaries. Notable changes amongst members' practices included: World Vision's development of information and complaints-handling centres and Tearfund's self-assessment and subsequent recruitment of accountability focal persons at key project sites. Again, these successes were due primarily to those members' own commitment to accountability, but the HAP team played a significant part in keeping accountability on the agenda and encouraging members to focus on information and complaints.

The Sudan HAP team made a significant contribution to HAP's research and standard development projects, culminating in an awareness-raising exercise unique amongst the three HAP field programmes. Over 500 beneficiaries and their representatives were briefed on their rights and responsibilities, in particular about the right to participate and voice opinions on the design and monitoring of relief interventions. Many beneficiaries informed HAP that they had not previously been aware of these rights and that they felt more confident to engage with NGO staff afterwards. This awareness-raising work was backed up by wide information dissemination in Arabic about agency missions, mandates and objectives. HAP was instrumental in encouraging (and sometimes directly facilitating) this work.

## **Challenges and lessons learned**

There were significant challenges faced by HAP in Sudan: a combination of unrealistic expectations, difficult logistics, a complex and insecure working environment, mixed levels of engagement, slow recruitment and a sense of isolation from the HAP Secretariat. In future operations, HAP needs to develop clearer bilateral agreements with members that better define respective roles, expectations and commitments. Fur-

ther, HAP may be able to operate more effectively in Sudan and similarly difficult political contexts if registered as a separate entity<sup>17</sup>. Also, the volatility of conditions in places such as Darfur necessitates greater strategic flexibility. Finally, much more lobbying of members and donors is required to ensure that accountability stays on the aid agenda in Sudan.

As in Pakistan, HAP in Sudan found very different levels of commitment to the Accountability Principles amongst the members present. Most field managers were either uninformed about the formal organisational commitment that goes with membership of HAP, or had been given discretion to not engage with HAP at all. Most of the people with whom commitments had been agreed when HAP first visited Sudan had left by the time HAP established a presence. Staff turnover continued to be a problem, as momentum in capacity building was often lost after senior staff moved on. HAP realised that its “New Emergencies Policy” deployments need to be better coordinated to ensure that all key managers (at HQs, regional offices and country offices) are engaged and supportive.

At the end of the project period, a survey revealed that all members were keen to see HAP’s presence in Darfur extended, albeit with a revised approach. HAP has committed to consulting the members in Sudan in 2007 to review this project.

## **Aceh – Indonesia**

In 2005 HAP helped to recruit an Accountability Coordinator based inside the Oxfam Programme Quality, Learning and Accountability Unit (PQLA) in Banda Aceh, with a 25% time allocation for HAP members. This arrangement ran from April to October 2006.

The Accountability Coordinator contributed significantly to the work of the Oxfam team, as well as to supporting HAP members more generally. Notably, the project secured members’ participation in the HAP Standard Development Project, interviewed beneficiaries to gather their views, documented and disseminated good practices, informed members wherever poor practices were evident, shared the HAP Principles and other documents, kept accountability on the agenda of coordination meetings, helped members to design pilot projects for complaints handling, and advised members on their accountability strategies.

## **A missed opportunity...**

However, as the capacity of the project was limited to a quarter of one person’s time, in the context of the world’s biggest emergency response, HAP’s tsunami project also

<sup>17</sup> Tearfund hosted HAP in Sudan. This arrangement was critical in providing HAP with a safe and supportive framework under which to operate. However, HAP later realised that being registered as an independent entity may have allowed more effective advocacy with Government, donors and member agencies, as well as greater freedom of movement.

missed many opportunities, especially given the widespread public debate about programme quality and accountability, once again provoked by the disappointing practices described in the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition and “Clinton Initiative” reports.

Several HAP Members in Aceh, and the other tsunami affected areas, recruited individuals and even teams to oversee and guide quality and accountability. But HAP should have played a far greater role in encouraging more collective efforts to promote compliance with the Accountability Principles. Most importantly, HAP itself could have engaged more directly with beneficiaries through the kind of opinion surveys and focus group discussions pioneered respectively by the Fritz Institute and the Listening Project. Ultimately, the international response to the tsunami failed to meet acceptable standards of accountability and quality management, even though these issues were identified early on and financial resources were, for once, abundant.

## General lessons

The establishment of a culture of accountability within aid agencies results from a combination of internal and external drivers. Without committed leadership and effective management, external pressures have little or no effect upon the behaviour of the agency. While all of HAP’s members have made a formal commitment to comply with the HAP Accountability Principles, not all see it as a priority, and as a consequence some members made no demands for HAP’s capacity building, monitoring or research services. HAP’s field support staff probably devoted too much time and energy in trying to stimulate demand from agencies that simply did not consider engagement with HAP to be a priority. In future, field-based services provided by HAP must be much more demand-driven, providing tailored advice and support for those agencies that really want it. Much more transparent reporting on those not fulfilling their obligations as HAP members is also needed. Otherwise, the growing value of the HAP brand will be eroded to the detriment of all members.

### ► Objective 1.4 – Accreditation/Certification

#### **Highlights**

- *Certification options reviewed*
- *Preferred option included in Strategic Plan*
- *Certification audit guidelines prepared*
- *One certification trial conducted*
- *Accreditation deferred for a year*

The HAP Secretariat reviewed certification and accreditation options, including the development of formal links with ISO, SGS and Social Accountability International.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The ISO 9000 Quality Management Standard, the SGS NGO Benchmark and the Social Accountability 8000 Standard.

While it was recognised that formal links with ISO and SAI might confer greater authority on the HAP Standard, both would take 2-3 years to conclude. In contrast, the Secretariat concluded that there would be no strategic advantage in linking up with the SGS NGO Benchmark as this was designed in a different way (without stakeholder consultation) and for different purposes (it is a commercial venture). The possibility of developing a partnership with SGS as a HAP certification franchise holder under the HAP accreditation scheme was not excluded.

The Medium Term Strategic Plan therefore focussed on getting HAP's own certification and accreditation processes up and running first, as delays in the availability of these products were already the source of much stakeholder frustration and damaging to HAP's reputation.

The unforeseen complexities of the Standard development process described under Objective 1.2 above did not, however, prevent practical progress from being achieved in developing the HAP Certification scheme. Draft Certification Guidelines were prepared with the help of one of the designers of the audit procedures for ECHO's Field Partnership Agreement (Olivier Tayar). Documentation prepared for the certification process included the Application File for agencies that wish to apply for certification, head office and field audit guidelines, and the related reporting formats.

A first certification trial was conducted with MERCY Malaysia in December 2006, after which it was decided to take the system live with agreements concluded with the Danish Refugee Council and OFADEC for certification audits to be conducted in early 2007, subject to the HAP Standard being adopted by the Board.

Accreditation, the process by which a HAP certification franchise can be awarded to a competent body, is the strategy through which HAP hopes to make humanitarian quality assurance more accessible and affordable. In developing the Medium Term Strategic Plan, the Secretariat decided that this process should be designed after the HAP Standard is finalised, and detailed work on the accreditation procedure was thus deferred to 2007.

## **SECTION 2. Developing our organisation**

### **► Objective 2.1 – Accountability Workplans (AWP) & Membership services**

#### ***Highlights***

- *Advice and support offered to all new members*
- *Workplans overdue from Norwegian Refugee Council, CAFOD, Medical Aid for Palestinians, and Save the Children UK*
- *AWP monitoring still on an ad hoc basis*

## Developing Accountability Workplans

HAP's membership rules require that full members submit an Accountability Workplan (AWP) within six months of joining the Partnership. In 2006, HAP offered AWP development support to all new members: MERCY Malaysia received a one-day orientation in Kuala Lumpur and feedback on their draft AWP, as well as training and resource materials to support the AWP development process. Christian Aid received training and resource materials to help them develop their AWP and further feedback through meetings, phone discussions and e-mail. Save the Children UK decided not to undertake AWP training pending a decision concerning certification.

At the end of 2006 four full members were in default of their obligation to submit an AWP to the HAP Secretariat. HAP was aware of various specific mitigating factors for the agencies in default. First, in 2006 the Secretariat stopped advising members to develop "stand-alone" AWPs, as experience had shown that a commitment to HAP's accountability principles needed to be integrated into the organisational strategic plan for these principles to gain significant traction over management practices. Second, with steady progress being achieved in developing the HAP Standard and certification scheme, several agencies assumed that HAP's focus would shift away from AWPs to HAP certification. When the launch of the certification scheme was postponed, this in effect placed several agencies unintentionally in default of their AWP obligations.

## Reporting on Accountability Workplans

For the first time, HAP asked members to present an annual report on the implementation of their AWPs at the General Assembly held in April 2006. Overall, this exercise was a great success and allowed members to share their experiences, challenges and good practices with each other. Some of this material was included in the 2005 Humanitarian Accountability Report. Positive feedback on this has led to section 3 of this report being devoted entirely to members' implementation reports.

## Monitoring Accountability Workplan Implementation

The HAP Secretariat's capacity to monitor the implementation of members' workplans was limited: first by the scale of the task compared with the small team available to do it; second by the lack of awareness of this being a legitimate function of the Secretariat; third by the limitations (and in some cases complete absence) of AWPs; and fourth by the significant growth in the number of full members. Thus AWP implementation monitoring happened on an *ad hoc* and opportunistic basis. On the occasions that HAP staff came across poor practice they informed the agency accordingly.

## ► Objective 2.2 – Complaints Handling

### **Highlights**

- *No complaints received against members*
- *Review of complaints handling policy deferred to 2007*
- *Complaints Handling Workshop held in Copenhagen*

### **Why no complaints?**

While the Secretariat considers that its complaints handling procedure is an essential dimension of its mandate, it was not called upon to convene the Complaints Handling Standing Committee in 2006, as no complaints against members were received. This was due to several factors. First, many HAP members had not fully developed, let alone implemented beneficiaries' complaints handling policies. Thus many beneficiaries of HAP's members' were still unaware of their right to complain or seek redress. Second, HAP's complaints handling policy itself was not widely disseminated. Indeed, HAP staff were not aware of any members disseminating information about the HAP complaints handling procedure to their beneficiaries. Third, without an agreed Accountability Standard, the HAP Secretariat felt that it would be difficult to conduct an investigation in an equitable, coherent and systematic manner. Fourth, the HAP Secretariat did not have the necessary expertise to conduct investigations into certain complex matters, such as allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

### **Complaints handling strategy**

The functionality of HAP's complaints handling procedure depends jointly upon HAP's members implementing their own beneficiaries' complaints handling system and upon HAP having the capacity to investigate complaints. The Medium Term Strategic Plan proposed a merger with ICVA's Building Safer Organisations to remedy the latter problem, and this was agreed with the HAP and ICVA boards in October. The proposed review of HAP's complaints handling policy was thus deferred to 2007 when greater in-house expertise will be available.

### **Capacity Building**

In the meantime, the Secretariat in cooperation with the Danish Refugee Council convened a complaints handling workshop in Copenhagen in April, designed to give practical help to members in developing their own complaints handling procedures. The resources produced for this event and a report on the proceedings were made available on the HAP website.<sup>19</sup> These materials probably constitute the most significant knowledge resource available on humanitarian complaints handling systems.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.hapinternational.org/en/complement.php?IDcomplement=57&IDcat=4&IDpage=76>

## ► Objective 2.3 – Growth of Membership:

### **Highlights**

- *Growth of membership not a priority in 2006*
- *New full Members – Save the Children, MERCY Malaysia and Christian Aid UK*
- *New Associate Member: Mango UK*
- *Accountability Event held in Dublin*
- *Accountability Workshop held with senior management team of Concern*

The HAP Secretariat workplan did not prioritise growth in membership during 2006, primarily because the organisation was not in a position to deliver effectively on critical elements of its core mandate while the Standard was still in development. Nonetheless, Save the Children UK, MERCY Malaysia and Christian Aid applied successfully to become full members, and MANGO UK became an associate member. In addition, the Secretariat, with assistance from the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held an accountability information event in Dublin, followed by an accountability workshop for the senior management team of Concern Worldwide.

## ► Objective 2.4 – Advocacy

### **Highlights**

- *The Humanitarian Accountability Report 2005 published*
- *Presented evidence to the UK Parliamentary enquiry on the tsunami response*
- *Mixed results from participation in the advisory committee to the “Clinton Initiative on NGO Impact”*
- *Presented the HAP certification scheme at Europe consultation on International Disaster Response Law*
- *Presented HAP Certification to Civil Society Accountability Workshop in Indonesia*

## **Writing about accountability...**

HAP's first published annual report was generally well received. 600 hard copies were distributed, but perhaps more importantly over 1,500 downloads were made from the website, by far HAP's most successful use of the Internet to date. In addition, the Humanitarian Practice Network published a response by the HAP Director to an earlier article on accountability by Jan Egeland, by the UN Relief Coordinator.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Nicholas Stockton, *The Accountability Alibi*, Humanitarian Exchange Number 34 – June 2006.

## Talking about accountability...

HAP was invited to present evidence to the UK's Parliamentary enquiry into the tsunami response; as a result, the all-party committee recommended *inter alia* that DFID should strengthen its accountability practices to beneficiaries and continue to support HAP.

HAP became an advisory member of President Clinton's NGO Impact Initiative, set up to identify practical ways to address lessons learned from the tsunami response. HAP devoted a considerable amount of time to this process, and the final report shows some signs of HAP's influence. The Secretariat was reassured that the various standards, codes and principles already developed by Sphere, People in Aid, Coordination Sud, Groupe URD and HAP was recognised in the report. However, the NGO Impact Initiative's recommendation to produce a global "professional" standard seemed to miss the point that the Quality and Accountability initiatives had also done much of this work and at the end of 2006 it was unclear how the NGO Impact Initiative was to be followed through without further duplication or proliferation of standards.

In numerous ways, all of HAP's Secretariat staff were involved in promoting humanitarian accountability and quality management. Amongst the many advocacy activities undertaken by HAP staff, the following deserve mention:

- Presentation on accountability given to Fritz Institute's 3rd meeting on quality and accountability in San Francisco
- Presentation on standards given at the MSF UK debate on "Whose standards are they"
- Presentation on accountability given at the SIDA Advanced Training Course in Humanitarian Action (ATHA)
- Presentation on quality and accountability trends given to the Inter Agency Working Group
- Presentation on accountability given to the US Red Cross Annual Programme Meeting
- Civicus workshop conducted jointly with One World Trust and ActionAid on beneficiary participation and accountability

## ► Objective 2.5 – Strategic development and relations

### **Highlights**

- *2007-2009 Medium Term Strategic Plan Agreed*
- *Agreed common use of Good Enough Guide with ECB*
- *Joint study on complementarities agreed with the Quality and Accountability Initiatives*
- *Agreed transfer of Builder Safer Organisations to HAP*
- *Agreed to visit ACFID in early 2007 for further strategic development discussions*

## Medium Term Strategic Plan – 2007 to 2009<sup>21</sup>

In January the HAP Secretariat initiated a process to prepare a Medium Term Strategic Plan for the period 2007-2009. With some modifications, the General Assembly and Board approved the Plan in April, thereby setting out a clear direction for the next three years for HAP. The planning process, which included interviews with the CEOs of all but one of HAP's full members, proved to be an effective mechanism for resolving many outstanding issues. It was also used as the basis for seeking renewed support from HAP's donors, most of whom responded positively. Annual reports from 2007 onwards will make direct reference to the targets set out in the strategic plan.

While the Strategic Plan formally takes effect in 2007, it also affected several elements in the 2006 Workplan. These changes are reported under the relevant headings in this report. One immediate effect was the cancellation of the plan to "re-launch" HAP. Instead, the strategic plan envisages the strengthening from 2007 of HAP's communications capacity.

## Strategic relations

In 2006 HAP concluded agreements with four strategic partners.

The Emergency Capacity Building<sup>22</sup> impact and accountability project (ECB2) to produce a handbook on accountability and impact measurement for field workers clearly overlapped with HAP's plan to produce the Manual of Humanitarian Accountability. Following negotiations it was agreed that the text of the "Good Enough Guide" would be integrated into HAP's Manual. This agreement prompted much more intensive collaboration on the development of the Good Enough Guide.

In the October meeting of the Quality and Accountability Initiatives<sup>23</sup>, it was decided that the collective claim of mutual complementarity should be re-examined in an independent review aiming to strengthen collaboration and promote integration. In many respects, this forum constituted a nascent "global professional standards" body of the sort envisaged by the Clinton Initiative. In effect, the group recognised that the overall impact of the initiatives was probably less than the potential sum of its parts.

In recognition of a much better strategic fit, ICVA agreed to the transfer of Building Safer Organisations to HAP. The HAP Secretariat thus integrated into HAP's self-regulatory framework a highly professional investigative capacity building team with a special focus on gender-based violence.

<sup>21</sup> [http://www.hapinternational.org/pdf\\_word/720-HAP-MediumTermStrategicPlan2007v7.pdf](http://www.hapinternational.org/pdf_word/720-HAP-MediumTermStrategicPlan2007v7.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> For details of members of ECB and the ECB2 project see: <http://www.ecbproject.org/>

<sup>23</sup> Participants were HAP, ALNAP, People in Aid, Sphere, Coordination Sud, Groupe URD and ECB2.

In another strategically important development, ACFID indicated that it wanted to design a pilot project to act as the HAP certification body in Australia. The HAP Director agreed to visit Australia in early 2007 to promote this initiative with Australian NGOs and AusAID.

## ► Objective 2.6 – Communications/Website development

### **Highlights**

- *Comprehensive updating of the content of the website carried out*
- *Website redesign postponed to 2007*
- *Part time Communications Manager appointed*

As a consequence of the postponement in finalising the certification scheme, HAP also decided to defer the redesign of the website in order that it could take proper account of the certification process. However, throughout 2006 HAP made a concerted effort to improve the quality of the content of its website, although employing an intern to improve the French pages proved less effective than hoped. Nevertheless, the website attracted a growing number of hits, with a daily average over the year of just over 250 visitors per day, a 25% improvement on 2005.

## ► Objective 2.7 – Fund-raising and donor reporting

### **Highlights**

- *96% of expenditure budget secured*
- *87% of field expenditure covered by earmarked income*
- *Donor reporting requirements met*

HAP posted record income in 2006, mainly on the basis of a successful fundraising year in 2005, which produced multi-year funding contracts with the Ford Foundation, Ireland, DFID, Sida, Danida, AusAID, the Netherlands, Oxfam GB and World Vision International. Later in the year attention was turned towards renewing several donor contracts. An invitation to submit a preliminary application to the Gates Foundation raised hopes that this donor might cover the expansion envisaged in the Strategic Plan. Applications were also submitted to the Norwegian and Swiss governments. Replies were still awaited from all three donors at the end of 2006.

Earmarked income for HAP's field support operations, amounting to 17% of total income, covered 87% of field expenditure, demonstrating robust financial backing of HAP's policy of maintaining a flexible field support capacity.

## ► Objective 2.8 – Governance and management

### **Highlights**

- *General Assembly and Board Meetings held*
- *Secretariat restructuring completed*
- *Zia Choudhury relocated to SCF UK London Office*
- *Other appointments deferred*

The HAP General Assembly held in April was widely acknowledged to be the best to date. Members' implementation reports were all useful and often inspiring. The HAP debate on the role of the media in humanitarian accountability was described in feedback as timely. The HAP Board met in April and again in October. The Board opted for a more efficient twice yearly meeting routine, where the April meeting would review the annual report and the October meeting would review the Secretariat's rolling workplan and budget for the forthcoming two years.

The Secretariat completed a restructuring process that replaced the posts of Coordinator and Communications and Administration Officer with the posts of Office Manager and Communications Manager. However, a suitable candidate for the Communications Management post was not found and the appointment of an administrative assistant was deferred after the new Office Manager streamlined many administrative procedures. The Membership Services Coordinator relocated for personal reasons from Geneva to the London office of Save the Children.

The Secretariat took the view that the plan to seek ISO 9000 certification should be deferred until HAP is closer to its planned capacity.

## **Conclusion**

By most conventional measures, the HAP Secretariat enjoyed an outstandingly successful year in 2006. HAP did most of the things that it said it would do, using slightly less money than it had budgeted. The draft Standard was completed, field support operations made solid progress, and increased support from donors made realisation possible. The strategic planning process dispelled much of the fog surrounding the medium term future of HAP, and HAP's first published annual report was widely distributed and generally appreciated.

However, as the review of humanitarian accountability in 2006 shows, there was still a very long way to go before basic norms of accountability to disaster survivors will be met across the humanitarian system. And while the "chorus of criticism" contained in the year's major reports actually demonstrates a welcome focus of attention on accountability and quality issues, the sector as a whole again revealed that it may be better at starting new initiatives than it is at making good use of them.

Consequently, many field staff reported their bewilderment at the prospect of being asked to participate in a HAP accountability audit, an SCHR accountability peer review, a People in Aid Code Audit, an ECB real-time participatory evaluation, a DEC or ACFID Code of Conduct compliance evaluation, an ALNAP joint-evaluation, a Sphere implementation review, an IASC Guidelines on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation implementation audit, an accreditation process under the UN cluster initiative and, soon perhaps, a “Global Professional Standards” self-assessment launched under the NGO Impact Initiative. It became increasingly clear to some agencies that they need to choose between these processes, as the traditionally small institutional accountability budgets in NGOs will not accommodate a serious commitment to them all.

In spite of this rather bleak assessment, the Secretariat of HAP ended 2006 in an optimistic mood. The founders of HAP had, in good faith, launched the Partnership in 2003 without agreement on the normative tools and procedures required to deliver on the Secretariat’s mandate to monitor compliance with the Accountability Principles and to accredit members accordingly. Unrealistically elevated expectations among donors of what could be achieved in its first year, in terms of financial self-reliance, growth of members and impact upon the sector, created a crisis of confidence in HAP in 2004. To have recovered from that low point to reach agreement on the HAP Standard and enjoy record donor support in 2006, attests to the compelling nature of HAP’s strategic proposition and to the determination of the accountability pioneers amongst HAP’s membership.

In 2007 HAP members can begin to prove through voluntary application of the HAP Standard and participation in the HAP certification scheme that a profound and long overdue reform of the humanitarian system is indeed within our collective grasp.

### 3. Members Reports

One of the obligations incumbent upon full members of HAP is the submission of an annual accountability implementation report, setting out progress achieved and challenges experienced in the implementation of the agency's Accountability Work Plan. While associate members are not obliged to submit an annual report to HAP, two have done so, and these reports are included below. Annual reports were not due from members that joined in 2006; therefore some of the full members are not represented below.

There is no prescribed format for the AWP implementation report, and most members kept their reports within the requested a 600-word limit. The reports are reproduced below in alphabetical order with only minor formatting changes.

## **Australian Council For International Development (ACFID)**

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ACFID is the national association for Australian NGOs working in aid and development. ACFID currently has 70 Full Members, plus an additional 30 NGOs who are signatories to our own industry Code of Conduct.

Since 2003 ACFID has been an associate member, only becoming a Full Member of HAP in April 2007. We recently concluded a two-year project funded by AusAID to examine the impact of HAP on Australian NGOs. The contract had three specific focus areas: the establishment of a HAP complaints handling mechanism; the completion of the quality and accountability manual; and the investigation of certification. ACFID contributed what it could to the first two outputs, and has begun investigations into the implementation of an Australian certification scheme for HAP. The contract also provided funding to the HAP Secretariat. The final report for this contract has been submitted and a new funding proposal is under consideration.

Since 2004, ACFID has been particularly interested in having our own HAP certification scheme. Australia's geographic location precludes our involvement in many international activities, which is one of the driving factors for seeking to implement a scheme for our region. ACFID will continue to move towards this system in close consultation with HAP and our own members.

We have been keeping our members up to date with the progress of the development of the standard through our weekly email bulletin, as well as on the HAP section of our website.

One of ACFID's contributions to HAP over the past year has been through providing comments on the various drafts of the Standard. We are particularly impressed at how the Standard turned out, and look forward to promoting its use throughout our membership.

A highlight of the past 12 months was ACFID's Humanitarian and Emergencies Program Coordinator attending the HAP Auditor training in Geneva. The training was not only an excellent way to become familiar with the Standard in more depth, but also to get an idea of what will be involved in the development of an ACFID-HAP certification scheme. Nicholas Stockton's visit to Australia March 2007 was also a highlight. After meeting with several of our members, there is a renewed commitment to the HAP principles and an interest from some members in future certification.

2006 has been an exciting year for both ACFID and HAP and we look forward to continuing our involvement in HAP over coming years.

## Danish Refugee Council

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2006 saw the completion of a 2-year process intended to strengthen accountability measures and practices throughout DRC. This allowed DRC to volunteer for pilot testing of HAP's new certification framework, culminating in the certification of DRC in April 2007.

### Achievements in 2006:

*Strengthening of DRC's QMS*, by the introduction of a new global planning and reporting framework. The framework allows for a more systematic tracking and communication of results, as well as a more systematic and planned approach to monitoring and evaluation. This has enhanced DRC's ability to communicate goals, activities, results and compliance with policies and standards.

*Testing and development of beneficiary complaints-handling mechanisms*, where significant efforts were invested in development of approaches, principles and tools. This process compiled experiences from functioning DRC complaints-handling systems in North Caucasus as well as new ones in Uganda, South Caucasus and Darfur. It also fed into an international seminar in Copenhagen on beneficiary complaints-handling, co-hosted by DRC. Moreover, DRC took a principal organisational decision to introduce beneficiary complaints-handling mechanisms in all DRC programmes over the next few years.

*Promoting partner accountability* – on how to strengthen DRC's accountability relationship with and support to partners (NGO and government):

- A review using accountability principles as evaluation criteria for reviewing the relationship between DRC and NGO partners (in the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia). The purpose was to develop more accountable models of partnership between DRC and NGO partners.
- The development of a guidance note and tools for how DRC can make use of and promote principles of good governance in its activities (still in progress).
- Facilitation of HAP accountability training among DRC partners in the Balkans and South Caucasus.

### Lessons learned

- *A systematic focus on beneficiary accountability is cost-effective.* For instance, a systematic approach to handling beneficiary complaints is more cost-effective and less time-consuming than ad hoc handling. It also provides a more demand-driven dynamic to programme monitoring.
- *The manner that accountability is communicated within the organisation is central.* If properly communicated and understood, most staff is enthusiastic and committed to promote accountability approaches and make use of HAP's accountability

framework and benchmarks. If not understood, accountability tends to be perceived as something technical and yet another fashion-of-the-week.

- *Nesting attention to accountability in regular QMS is crucial.* Organisational attention to accountability issues tends to be more committed and actually pursued if mainstreamed within the regular quality management systems, and not applied as a stand-alone priority.

### **Challenges:**

- That staff and organisational attention to beneficiary accountability is rewarded and treated by the organisation's internal reward system - and by the donors - as important and, preferably, even more important than the traditional attention to donor accountability.
- To develop a practical and durable approach to promoting accountability principles among partner organisations and to supporting them in that regard.
- To develop a practical approach for ensuring minimum requirements for beneficiary information and participation in DRC programmes despite very adverse conditions in some situations.

### **Plans for 2007:**

- Maintain accountability as a critical focus in global and field strategy planning and prioritisation. This includes, but is not limited too, the implementation of corrective actions resulting from the certification process.
- Extend beneficiary complaints-handling to more programmes.
- By end-2007, publish a manual for field-based complaints-handling, which will also be of relevance for other organisations.
- Strengthen information to and communication with beneficiaries.
- Integrate attention to accountability in DRC's Human Resource systems (ToRs; Staff development, etc).
- Completion of the revision of DRC's programme manual and mainstreaming accountability into it.

# CAFOD

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## 1. Introduction and summary

Work on accountability in humanitarian action has moved forward significantly over the year. During our operational planning year 2007/8 we hope to undertake a baseline study to inform a decision on certification. CAFOD has not yet prepared an accountability work plan, We expect this to be a key outcome of the baseline study process this coming year.

## 2. Activities undertaken during 2006-7

### a. *Engagement with the HAP standard development process*

During 2006, CAFOD staff contributed to the development of the HAP standard through the reference group and the HAP secretariat. This process has also helped to increase awareness on HAP across CAFOD.

In our participation in the standard development process it has been particularly important to explore questions of partnership with civil society partners and the implications for partners of CAFOD adopting the HAP standard. We have been encouraged by the efforts that have been made to accommodate partnership issues in the HAP standard, and look forward to exploring the issue further in 2007/8.

### b. *Internal Audit*

CAFOD's internal audit framework has strengthened, with increased staffing and a new framework in place. The mandate of internal auditors extends in part to assessment of compliance with agreed humanitarian standards and codes of conduct. New whistle-blowing, fraud and loss policies are newly in place, as well as strengthened financial training for programme staff.

### c. *Integration/awareness of HAP across CAFOD systems*

CAFOD is introducing a new programme cycle management system for its international programme work in May 2007, with a roll out process now taking place. Efforts have been made to include humanitarian quality standards within the monitoring and impact assessment framework, including beneficiary accountability issues.

The core principles of the system adopted include the following statements:

*“We will be accountable for our actions and transparent about what we do – with our partners, towards beneficiaries, and with back-donors*

*We have co-responsibility with our partners (and through them with beneficiaries) for the success of our programmes*

*We will be fully committed to real time learning from our programme work as well as learning from impact*<sup>24</sup>

#### *d. Evaluation*

Investment in evaluations and learning exercises has increased in the past year, with a new evaluation policy to be developed during the operational year 2007/08. We continue to encourage the use of standard evaluation indicators using the OECD-DAC criteria, and share evaluations with the open source ALNAP database.

#### *e. Child Protection Policy*

An upgraded child and vulnerable adults protection policy is now in development and should be in place during 2007.

#### *f. Case study – Pakistan*

CAFOD's programme supporting Caritas Pakistan has sought to explicitly introduce a HAP approach to accountability, with a dedicated accountability officer. A good working relationship has existed with the HAP in-country team, and learning from the case study is helpful as we move towards the baseline study.

#### *g. Partners' workshop – Kenya*

A workshop was held in Kenya with a number of NGO partners, supported by a HAP staff member, exploring the implications of HAP for partners. The report is available, and notes positive attitudes by partners to the concepts of beneficiary accountability discussed.

### **3. Future work planned for 2007-8**

A cross-organisational accountability working group has been established to oversee CAFOD's involvement and engagement with different accountability initiatives. The group will also look at CAFOD's involvement in HAP and the HAP standard. We plan to undertake a baseline study against the HAP standard during 2007/8, under the supervision of the accountability working group.

*Tim Aldred  
Head of Humanitarian Response  
and Technical Support  
CAFOD*

*17 May 2007*

<sup>24</sup> CAFOD Programme Cycle Management – Core Principles of Programme Management (internal document 2007).

## CARE International

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### Progress Made & Challenges Faced

- CARE is a federation of twelve autonomous members comprising 13,000 staff which works in some 65 countries managed on behalf of CARE International by one of three “Lead” or “Designated” members within a decentralized model. Only 30% of CARE’s resources are classified as relief, the remainder as development and many of CARE’s activities are implemented through local partners.
- HAP Standards did not figure in CARE’s original workplan that ended in mid-2006, so it was decided to wait until the Standards and associated protocols became clearer before developing a new work plan.
- CARE’s initial HAP work plan envisaged “pilot” learning centers in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Indonesia. This approach resulted in some valuable learning, notably in Cambodia and Indonesia, but has had limited impact on the organization as a whole.
- A number of CARE staff participated in the development of the HAP standards, including a CARE researcher seconded to HAP.
- CARE is a large and diverse federation that recognizes that institutional changes described our work plan will take several years.
- In response to feedback from the field, the ECB project has pulled together various accountability standards and practice into the “Good Enough Guide to Accountability & Impact Measurement” and associated training.

### Monitoring & Evaluation of the HAP Workplan

- *Increased reference to accountability principles:*
  - Increased emphasis placed on accountability to disaster-affected communities.
  - CARE’s Humanitarian Benchmarks inform capacity assessments, monitoring, and evaluations.
- *Examples of use of accountability indicators:*
  - A synthesis of evaluations and After Action Reviews (AAR) of humanitarian actions over the past five years highlighted ways of promoting accountability towards communities.
  - A utilization study of CARE evaluations & AARs has resulted in greater attention to timely communication of results that are better tailored to specific target audiences.
- *Numbers and types of trainings and associated activities:*
  - HAP support to CARE Pakistan.
  - Support and participation in HAP Standards Development Workshops.

- Integration into Good Enough Guide training module.
- Sphere trainings were conducted in more than ten countries, of which five were associated with Sphere program reviews.
- CARE, World Vision and Oxfam facilitated an inter-agency session on humanitarian accountability in London.
- Quality & Accountability Specialists conducted reviews of field operations and provided TA.
- *Evidence of existence and use of information dissemination and feedback (“complaints”) mechanisms for intended beneficiaries;*
  - Most emergencies now feature an entitlement system, but CARE’s experience with complaints mechanisms have so far been limited (Indonesia, Cambodia, Zimbabwe).
- *Existence of a dedicated M&E staff:*
  - Increasing requests for TA during the early stages of an emergency.
  - Piloted HAP standards and Good Enough Guide during emergencies in Java and Guatemala).
  - Five members of the “Standing Team” added to CARE’s Emergency Response Team (CERT) roster.
- *Functioning institutional accountability system:*
  - Humanitarian Benchmarks used during the past two years.
  - Work started under the ECB project to develop a common accountability framework for 5-6 large international NGOs.
  - Issues paper to frame discussions around possible certification processes.

## Next Steps

- CARE will continue to strive for improved quality and accountability through application of CARE’s “Humanitarian Benchmarks”.
- Experience with the previous HAP work plan demonstrated the limitations of pilot country learning approach. The current energy within CARE around the “Good Enough Guide” and the associated training can help promote application of the HAP Standards.
- “*Greater internal & external accountability*” is a cornerstone of CARE International’s new strategy, which will help to promote humanitarian accountability. The SCHR Peer Review on accountability starting in mid-2007 will also help.

## Mango

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During 2006, Mango has supported HAP and HAP's aims in a number of ways, described below. We do not have an accountability workplan, because we are an Associate Member of HAP and a service organisation, supporting operational NGOs.

### Direct contribution to HAP

Mango is delighted to have joined HAP as an Associate Member in 2006. This makes concrete the strong overlap in aims and approaches between the two organisations.

During 2006, Mango's Director, Alex Jacobs, was a member of the Editorial Steering Committee, contributing to drafting HAP's 2007 standard.

### Promoting HAP's aims

Mango works with international and local NGOs around the world. We continued to promote discussion among them of the critical importance of downward accountability during the year. We also helped NGOs to pilot practical tools to enhance their downward accountability. This work falls within our aim of supporting NGOs' own innovations in developing systems to build trust between their field staff and their intended beneficiaries.

For example, we brought respected academics and the Finance Directors of major relief and development agencies together for a series of seminars, which included a discussion of accountability. We worked with Concern and Oxfam to pilot new tools to monitor the extent of their downward accountability (in line with the HAP standard). We taught a module on a university Masters course specifically on the accountability and effectiveness of NGO action.

Throughout the year, we promoted our Who Counts? campaign and HAP in Mango's Guide to Financial Management for NGOs (see [www.mango.org.uk/guide](http://www.mango.org.uk/guide)). This flagship publication has a specific focus on helping NGOs develop internal systems which are based on two golden rules: (1) NGOs have to maintain a respectful dialogue with the people they aim to help, and (2) NGOs depend on their field staff and have to empower them to make good judgements. These are in line with HAP's aims. Our Guide is widely used around the world, with over 63,000 documents downloaded from it in 2006, by at least 20,000 users from over 150 countries. A survey showed that 79% of users currently work in NGOs.

During 2006, Mango's Director chaired the advisory committee for BOND's research on Quality Standards, and currently chairs the steering committee for the subsequent working group. The research concluded that "the quality of an NGO's [field]work is primarily determined by the quality of its relationships with its intended beneficiaries". The working group exists to help BOND's members develop ways of putting this conclusion into practice. See <http://quality.bond.org.uk> for details.

In mid 2006, Mango undertook a strategic review, developing four strategic objectives for the organisation for the period 2007-2009. One of these is “piloting new tools for monitoring and managing NGO performance”. These tools will place the views of intended beneficiaries centre-stage, for instance by asking them how much they value the work that an NGO has undertaken on their behalf, or by monitoring key factors that influence the relationship between an NGO and its intended beneficiaries (at the project level), such as levels of transparency or participation. It is hoped that these efforts will contribute to helping NGOs implement the HAP Standard.

Mango remains committed to collaborating with HAP in 2007 and beyond.

### **Enhancing Mango’s accountability to our clients**

During the year, Mango has taken steps to enhance our own accountability. We have developed and implemented a complaints policy, details of which are available on-line. We systematically monitor the views of users of our services (for instance through routine evaluations and an on-line survey), and have published summaries of these views on-line and in our annual report. See [www.mango.org.uk](http://www.mango.org.uk) for details.

## Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP)

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Medical Aid for Palestinians joined Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – International as a full member in March 2005. MAP's new Programme Manager is due to start in June 2007 and she will be the point of contact for HAP in the future.

As a member of the Editorial Steering Committee MAP's previous Programme Manager attended the HAP meeting on the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> of December 2006 in Geneva. The development of our accountability workplan will be picked up with the start of our new Programme Manager next month. Our former Chief Executive was previously on the board of Humanitarian Partnership – International. Our new Chief Executive took up his post in November 2006 and is reviewing MAP's organisational strategy. As such we hope to be able to carry forward our commitment to HAP this year.

As a full member MAP is eager to keep up its commitment to HAP and to remain involved and be more active in the near future. We remain deeply committed to the principles of accountability and ways of achieving greater accountability to our beneficiaries.

*Tom Hutchinson  
Programme/Fundraising Officer  
Medical Aid for Palestinians*

*May 2007*

## Medair

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Beneficiary accountability continues to be high on the corporate agenda at Medair. The progress report demonstrates that over the last 18 months most of the energy and creativity in this area is rightly taking place at field level.

Over the last year, particularly due to the intensive standards development process, significant amounts of time were also spent on HAP facing activities. We look forward to concentrating even more of our efforts over the coming year on promoting and enabling accountability at field level.

Over the last 2 years, Medair has piloted complaints handling mechanisms in all new emergency programmes (Sri Lanka tsunami response, Pakistan earthquake response and Indonesia post-tsunami response). Each of these programmes have written up case studies, to capture their experience

There is a general commitment to beneficiary accountability amongst field staff. Specific highlights of this commitment are as follows:

**Indonesia.** A Beneficiary feedback mechanism was developed at the outset of the programme last Summer, to enable beneficiaries to complain and give constructive criticism to enable us to improve. To ensure the system was appropriate for the Indonesia setting we worked together with our Senior Community Mobiliser at the design stage of the mechanism and then consulted with the beneficiaries themselves before determining the final implementation strategy. To date 32 complaints have been received. Further details of the Indonesia experience are available in a Case Study.

**Pakistan.** In the second phase of the programme from April 2006 onwards, the team undertook a livelihoods project consisting of buffalo and seed distributions. Beneficiaries participated in the project design and monitoring in the following ways; initially the team wanted to distribute cows (known as F1 stock—high yield & disease resistant) however after surveying beneficiaries, it was clear they wanted traditional buffalos, as they were a common breed in the area and more status was attached to owning buffalos than cows. Medair put together a selection of seeds and beneficiaries had the option to choose which seeds they wanted. Beneficiaries were provided with feedback forms following the distributions to monitor general satisfaction levels and the quality of the goods.

**North Sudan.** Training and briefing; HAP briefing for all newly arrived International Staff. Occasional briefing/training sessions for National Staff; sessions on HAP or broader issues of ‘participation’ in some of the Project Managers workshops and team conferences. 1 day Beneficiary Accountability training course run by Country Director in Nuba Mountains in April 2007.

**South Sudan.** The team have designed signs for all fixed site locations, using pictorial images and local languages to state who Medair is, the donors and what the projects consist of. The Capacity Building team and Communications team are working on Medair publicity materials in a locally accessible format

**Afghanistan.** Patient satisfaction questionnaires are completed once a month at each health clinic. 5 patients are interviewed about their satisfaction with the services at each health facility. The feedback is evaluated by the Afghanistan management team and steps taken to ensure high quality and responsive services

**Congo.** Psycho-social – beneficiary satisfaction survey in April 2006 involving 46 people who had received Medair counseling services. Surveys undertaken every year since 2003 on prevalence of post-traumatic stress in the population. Report to be published in an academic journal this year on pre and post-testing of beneficiaries to look at effectiveness of the psychosocial programme. Beneficiary opinions about the content of training courses are sought through questionnaires.

**Uganda.** In the Patongo psychosocial and watsan projects, focus groups have been held with affected communities to assess needs and understand how they can best be addressed.

**Madagascar.** Medair Monitoring Unit: the Madagascar programme monitoring unit oversees the impact of Medair's interventions. This unit is independent of the project and carries out regular surveys and interviews to evaluate the interventions from the beneficiaries perspective and to suggest improvements.

## Challenges

HAP focused business vs field focus. During the course of this year, much time and attention has rightly been taken up with HAP facing business, such as the Standards Development process. Due to the fact that we have limited resources, this has meant less time was available to promote accountability in the field

Beneficiary champions vs line management approach to mainstreaming. Whilst we recognise the need for Beneficiary champions throughout the organisation at this stage as a critical catalyst, we would like to reach a point where beneficiary accountability is seen as the responsibility of all managers within Medair.

Building confidence to talk about accountability – the subject area is full of jargon and complex terminology, which can make it difficult to engage busy field teams.

## MERCY Malaysia

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The year 2006 was a year for development, consolidation and change management for MERCY Malaysia. While we continued to respond to emergencies and implement our on going relief programmes abroad, the move towards strengthening our organisation, structurally, financially and in our human capital development, remain high on our agenda.

MERCY Malaysia made significant inroads with our humanitarian accountability commitment when we became a full member of the Geneva based Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) in 2006. We developed our accountability work plan and proceed to work towards an integrated quality assurance and management system and a humanitarian accountability framework. As a young organisation, MERCY Malaysia had the advantage to leverage on its unique position to adapt to international standards, growing our organisation through learning from best practices of other more established international organisations. Our unique position allowed us to develop our own standards while implementing proven methods and this approach gave MERCY Malaysia the edge to further enhance its organisational growth.

We were actively engaged in various consultations in the development of the HAP 2007 Standards in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management through the Editorial Working Group and other working groups spearheaded by HAP. We felt that this was an important process to ensure that views from a relatively young “southern” based organisation were adequately represented.

We then began to align our organisation towards the Standards that were being developed, recognising the critical importance of improving our quality management system and to improve our accountability to our beneficiaries. In the 8 years MERCY Malaysia has been in existence we have been profoundly conscious of our fundamental principle of impartiality, ensuring beneficiary consultation, respecting local culture, knowledge and customs and delivering aid based on needs alone, irrespective of creed, religion or boundaries. This has enabled us to implement our programmes in some of the more challenging regions including Afghanistan, West Darfur in Sudan, Iraq, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

We took that commitment one step further by opening our organisation to a pre audit exercise in late 2006. The pre audit clarified further where our strengths were and gave us the opportunity to examine key areas of improvement and enhancement. MERCY Malaysia plans to embark on a certification in 2007.

On the home front, we made a strong commitment towards transparency with the publication of an abridged version of our 2005 audited financial report in two promi-

ment newspapers in Malaysia. The full audited financial report is a permanent section in our Annual Reports and is also made available on our website.

## **Strategic Partnerships**

MERCY Malaysia through our strategic partnerships with notable Malaysian organisations was able to invest in our human resource and organisational growth. In 2006, with the support of our corporate donors, MERCY Malaysia created a separate fund for its Operations and Administration. We also made investment in our organisation's disaster preparedness programme with the setting up of our Emergency Response Unit. In addition, we established a Central Emergency Fund that will enable us to deploy teams and supplies faster and with greater efficiency.

## **Relief Operations**

In 2006, MERCY Malaysia provided aid to people of Lebanon in the reconstruction of its health infrastructure that was destroyed in the Lebanon-Israel War and provided medical supplies and non food items to refugees in Syria. MERCY Malaysia also deployed a team to the Philippines in response to the havoc in the Bicol Region wrecked by Typhoon Durian.

The organisation's commitment to providing humanitarian assistance is not limited to times of disasters only. We continue to provide our services in Cambodia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Indonesia – Aceh, Nias and Yogyakarta, and the Maldives.

In Malaysia, we continuously carried on with our primary health care services through mobile clinic programmes for remote communities in Sabah and Sarawak as we have done in previous years.

MERCY Malaysia continued to build its organisational and human resource capacity in expanding its operations to include Total Disaster Risk Management (TDRM). We continue to learn and put the TDRM principles into practice in most of our projects. As an organisation that strives to be fully accountable to its beneficiaries, we have a duty to ensure that we do not rebuild vulnerabilities but instead make investments into building capacities and resilience.

## Norwegian Refugee Council

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In 2006, NRC pursued several initiatives aimed at improving accountability. *HAP facilitated trainings* in Sudan and Pakistan were the first field programs in this new partnership. At the international management level, NRC developed the *balanced scorecard*. Accountability initiatives were also field-led; program managers have parallel responsibility for ensuring accountability objectives are met.

### HAP and Country Programs

In 2006 HAP facilitated trainings and discussion on approaches to accountability in NRC's programs in NWF, Pakistan, and Darfur, Sudan. Experience with these trainings was positive for those projects which participated. Trainings were particularly relevant for Food Distribution and Education teams. Camp management proved more challenging. Discussions on HAP engagement with camp management highlighted concerns between accountability/political sensitivity and identifying/accessing independent interlocutors. Camp management accountability exercises also need to balance two distinct groups of beneficiaries; camp residents and service providers.

### Balanced Scorecard

The balanced scorecard, a new quality management tool, brings beneficiary accountability to the level of *strategy management*. The balanced scorecard is undergoing initial field testing in two countries; Liberia and Colombia.

This tool is devised to examine standard, broad-based indicators across all countries in which NRC operates. This scorecard is used in addition to program assessments and external evaluations which are a normal part of the programming cycle. The scorecard is comparable to business management models, but with some crucial differences. Placing beneficiaries perspectives above all other categories, including funding, ensures country management retains this central focus.

### Local Initiatives

Accountability mechanisms must always be locally relevant. The NRC shelter program in Afghanistan, for example, adopted local domed roof designs after consultation with village elder groups, known as Shura. However in areas with unequal power balances within communities, the participation of local authorities is not enough to ensure beneficiary participation in decision making processes. Personal interaction between staff and beneficiaries, while unstructured, have further informed planning processes to help bridge this gap.

Camp Management offers a further example of project-level initiatives to address access to decision-making and information. Camp managers have a range of pos-

sible interlocutors. Traditional leadership are recognized to be simultaneously both representatives and gatekeepers to the broader camp community. Camp managers have a responsibility to ensure that camp committees are as broad based as possible, including ensuring representation by women. Other means of interaction with camp communities, both structural and informal, must also be pursued to avoid monopolization of dialogue.

## Office Africain pour le Développement et la Coopération (OFADEC)

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### Rapport d'activités

Depuis juin 2003, à l'instar de tous les membres de HAP-I, l'OFADEC s'est engagé à établir des principes de redevabilité et de les intégrer dans son système de gestion. Pour ce faire, un plan de travail redevabilité a été élaboré, une équipe HAP-I de OFADEC mise sur pied en janvier 2004 comprenant :

- 1 M. N. Directeur Général
- 2 A. D. Chargé de Projet
- 3 N. L. Conseiller à l'éducation, nommé Point Focal de HAP-I

Au travers de ce plan de travail et dans le cadre du programme d'assistance aux réfugiés au Sénégal, les activités ont été menées comme suit :

#### I Diffusion principes redevabilité

#### II Formation du personnel

#### III Réunion d'information sur les programmes et critères d'attribution d'assistance, évaluation, mise en œuvre et planification des programmes d'assistance.

#### IV Etudes des standards

#### V Traitement des plaintes

### I/ Diffusion principes redevabilité

L'équipe HAP-I de l'OFADEC mise en place depuis janvier 2004 s'est attelée tout d'abord à faire connaître HAP-I et son plan de travail redevabilité, à élaborer un plan de travail redevabilité OFADEC pour le rendre redevable.

Une réunion de présentation de HAP-I regroupant tout le personnel de l'OFADEC s'est tenue en septembre 2004. Cette réunion a été marquée par un large débat et a permis à tout le personnel de prendre à cœur ces principes de redevabilité, et de s'engager à mieux faire pour rendre l'organisation plus redevable. Des notes d'information (copie ci-jointe) et les codes de conduite disponibles (code de conduite HCR et code de conduite Croix Rouge) ont été distribués à tout le personnel.

En novembre 2004, une réunion d'information regroupant les Représentants des réfugiés au Sénégal et l'équipe HAP-I de l'OFADEC, s'est tenue au tour des points suivants :

- **Le Partenariat pour la Redevabilité Humanitaire International (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International)**
- **Qu'est-ce que la redevabilité ?**

- **Le plan de travail redevabilité en général et le plan de travail de redevabilité OFADEC en particulier.**
- **Le point Focal et ses termes de référence**
- **Discussions**

De larges discussions et commentaires ont été enregistrés avec la participation active des réfugiés qui ont manifesté leur adhésion aux principes de redevabilité. L'essentiel des interventions des réfugiés a tourné autour des problèmes suivants :

- Manque de communication entre l'organisation et les réfugiés.
- Manque de participation des réfugiés aux prises de décisions dans les programmes qui les concernent
- La soumission des plaintes.

Des réponses claires ont été fournies par l'équipe de l'OFADEC appuyée par Maximilien, qui a pris aussi une part active aux débats. Les suggestions mais aussi les préoccupations des réfugiés ont été notées pour une prise en compte dans l'élaboration des procédures, particulièrement au niveau de la procédure de traitement des plaintes. Pour répondre à certaines de leurs préoccupations, il leur a été proposé de nommer un Point Focal des bénéficiaires qui travaillera en étroite collaboration avec le Point de l'OFADEC. Le principe a été accepté.

Des dépliants d'information sur les programmes du BOS donnant l'ensemble des critères et des procédures d'assistance au niveau de chaque secteur ont été distribués aux représentants des réfugiés et mis à la disposition de tout le monde au niveau des bureaux et centres d'accueil des réfugiés.

Les documents suivants (ci-joints) ont été distribués aux participants:

- Note d'information au personnel et au comité des réfugiés
- Les termes de références du point focal de la redevabilité
- Plan de travail redevabilité OFADEC en français et en anglais.
- Dépliants d'information sur les programmes du BOS

Ci-joint le procès verbal de la réunion de novembre 2004.

Pour informer et impliquer davantage les bénéficiaires dans la gestion des programmes, des réunions sectorielles d'information et de réflexion sont régulièrement organisées avec les réfugiés.

Ainsi, le 5 octobre 2005, une rencontre d'échange d'information sur le sous projet éducation s'est tenue sur le thème suivant:

1. Critères et procédures d'attribution de l'assistance pour l'éducation
2. Enregistrement des enfants à l'école
3. Enregistrement des naissances des enfants réfugiés.

Des personnes externes expertes en la matière ont pris part aux discussions pour éclairer davantage les points de vue des uns et des autres. Il s'agit de :

- Madame S., Directrice de l'enseignement élémentaire au Ministère de l'éducation nationale
- Maître F. D., Avocat Général auprès de la Cour

Concernant l'aide à l'éducation, les critères d'attribution des bourses ont été largement débattus avec les bénéficiaires qui n'ont pas manqué de faire des suggestions portant sur le critère « âge ». Le souhait pour les bénéficiaires est que ce critère ne soit pas un facteur bloquant pour certaines personnes âgées désirant suivre des formations complémentaires. Il a été répondu aux réfugiés que l'objectif du HCR est de donner la chance aux jeunes sans qualification, étant entendu que la plupart des personnes âgées ont une certaine qualification et peuvent bénéficier du programme des microprojets pour leur intégration.

Concernant la scolarisation des enfants, la Directrice de l'enseignement élémentaire à exposé les procédures et les critères pour l'enregistrement des enfants à l'école au niveau du Sénégal, critères qui portent essentiellement sur l'âge et les papiers d'état civil.

L'avocat général a fait un exposé de la procédure d'enregistrement des naissances au Sénégal. Il a indiqué que tout enfant né au Sénégal, quelle que soit la nationalité de ses parents, doit être enregistré. L'enregistrement ne signifie pas la naturalisation mais permet à l'enfant d'avoir des papiers d'état civil qui vont lui servir partout particulièrement dans les démarches administratives (ex : enregistrement à l'école)

A la lumière des exposés, les réfugiés ont exprimé leur satisfaction pour les informations fournies, particulièrement l'information portant sur l'enregistrement des naissances. En effet beaucoup de réfugiés (mauritaniens particulièrement) pensent que les pièces d'état civil délivrées à l'enfant à la naissance, confèrent à celui-ci la nationalité du pays hôte.

## **II/ Formation du personnel sur la notion de redevabilité**

### *a) Rencontre de mise à niveau, d'échange et d'interprétation des codes de conduite.*

Dans le AWP OFADEC, il est prévu des ateliers de formation au profil du personnel de l'OFADEC sur la **redevabilité**.

C'est pourquoi il a été organisé une rencontre de mise à niveau d'échange et d'interprétation des codes de conduite du HCR et de la Croix-Rouge le 11 mars 2005 regroupant tout le personnel de l'OFADEC, à qui des exemplaires des deux codes avaient été distribués quelques mois auparavant pour étude.

L'ensemble des points des deux codes ont fait l'objet de commentaires, de larges échanges. Certains points tels que « EQUITÉ », « NEUTRALITÉ », « EXPLOITATION ET ABUS » ont suscité un large débat faisant l'objet d'une attention particulière.

L'objectif de la séance est de permettre au personnel de l'OFADEC de mieux connaître les règles qui doivent régir leur travail de tous les jours pour mieux servir les bénéficiaires.

*b) Formation du personnel de l'OFADEC sur les procédures d'enquêtes et le traitement des plaintes relatives aux abus et exploitations sexuelles.*

Le point focal Nfanda Lamba et l'assistante sociale Charlotte Sarr ont participé du 23 au 27 mai 2005 à la formation sur les procédures d'enquêtes relatives aux abus et exploitations sexuelles organisée par ICVA à Dakar.

Cette formation a pour but de faire connaître et familiariser les participants aux :

- **Principes fondamentaux en matière d'enquête ou de traitement de plaintes dans le cas des abus et exploitations sexuelles et d'autres abus.**
- **Qualités dont doit faire preuve le personnel lorsqu'il mène des enquêtes relatives aux abus et exploitations sexuelles, à savoir : la confidentialité, l'impartialité, l'objectivité, la compétence...**
- **Aux devoirs et responsabilités des agences à s'assurer que les bénéficiaires sont traités avec dignité et respect , l'objectif étant de créer un environnement sans exploitation et abus sexuel au travers la fonction de protection et d'assistance.**

Une séance de restitution durant une journée en juin 2005 a été organisée au profit du personnel de l'OFADEC.

**III/ Réunions d'information sur le programme et les critères d'attribution d'assistance, évaluation, mise en œuvre et planification des programmes d'assistance.**

Des réunions regroupant le HCR, l'OFADEC et les Représentants des bénéficiaires sur les programmes d'assistance sont devenues chose courante depuis maintenant 2 ans. Ainsi, le 2 février 2005 et le 24 février 2006 ont été organisées des rencontres dont l'ordre du jour a porté sur :

- **Echanger des informations sur le programme et les critères d'attribution d'assistance**
- **Evaluer ensemble le programme de l'année écoulée**
- **Discuter de la mise en œuvre du nouveau programme et faire des suggestions pour une meilleure planification du programme de l'année suivante**

A chacune des rencontres, ces points ont fait l'objet d'un large débat avec la participation active des représentants des réfugiés qui s'offrent ainsi à chaque fois l'occasion de donner leur avis et faire des suggestions. Mieux, ils présentent à chaque rencontre un document avec des propositions concrètes portant sur les différents points du programme qui leur est destiné. Leurs avis et propositions sont recueillis par l'OFADEC

et le HCR et font toujours l'objet de rencontres ultérieures pour prendre en compte leurs préoccupations. Des notes sont produites par la suite et une large diffusion des décisions est faite par le biais des affichages et des rencontres organisées au sein des communautés des réfugiés par les représentants.

Ces rencontres permettent :

- **Aux participants (HCR, OFADEC et Réfugiés) d'harmoniser leur point de vue sur les différents points du programme.**
- **D'informer les réfugiés de la gestion du programme et des critères d'assistance en vigueur.**
- **D'impliquer ces réfugiés dans l'évaluation et la mise en œuvre du programme.**

Les rencontres participent de la volonté d'associer les réfugiés à la conception et à la gestion du programme.

Concernant l'assistance en 2006, il a été porté à la connaissance des représentants des réfugiés de la diminution drastique des fonds alloués à ce programme, diminution qui est une conséquence directe des difficultés financières que rencontre actuellement le HCR.

Le point a fait l'objet d'un large débat entre tous les participants, y compris les réfugiés, l'objectif étant de proposer ensemble des solutions pour une meilleure utilisation de ces fonds en redéfinissant les critères d'assistance médicale.

Des rencontres se sont poursuivies au sein d'un comité regroupant les réfugiés, l'OFADEC et le HCR, commission qui a pour mission de discuter et proposer de nouveaux critères en concertation avec les réfugiés.

Le 2 mai 2006, ce comité s'est réuni et a adopté plusieurs nouveaux critères pour la prise en charge médicale, nouveaux critères qui sont l'émanation des différents participants, notamment des réfugiés. (Ci-jointe copie compte rendu réunion du 2/05/06).

#### **IV/ Études des Standards**

Dans le cadre de la mise en place des outils de gestion entreprise par HAP-I, l'OFADEC a entrepris d'apporter sa contribution en invitant, le 6 juin 2006, plusieurs organisations humanitaires et aussi des réfugiés à discuter et commenter les 7 standards proposés. Les participants sont : Amnesty International, PARI/Caritas, HCR, BOS/OFADEC, CRSS, A.E.E.R.M.S et des réfugiés d'un niveau d'étude très élevé.

Les discussions ont été d'un niveau très élevé. Chaque participant a donné son analyse et son point de vue sur chaque standard. Les réfugiés ont participé à cette étude de manière active. Ils ont eu une fois de plus l'occasion de donner leur point de vue sur le

type de rapport qui doit exister entre eux et l'agence. Les problèmes de communication et de participation des bénéficiaires aux instances de décisions qui les concernent ont été mis en exergue. Leur point de vue a fait l'objet de notes à tenir compte dans les principes de gestion au sein de notre agence, le souci étant le renforcement de la redevabilité envers les bénéficiaires par la diffusion des informations à temps et au plus grand nombre et aussi la rapidité des réponses à donner. C'est dans ce sens qu'il a été annoncé aux participants l'ouverture prochaine d'un E-mail et d'une boîte « SINFOR » qui a pour but de collecter les avis des uns et des autres (bénéficiaires et staff) au BOS.

Ci-joint compte-rendu réunion.

## **V/ Traitement des plaintes**

Quelques plaintes ont fait l'objet de traitement :

### *a) Plainte d'un réfugié suite au rejet par le projet de sa demande de prise en charge médicale.*

En août 2004, le réfugié Mamadou Ly a dû évacuer d'urgence dans la nuit sa femme malade dans l'un des hôpitaux privés de la place appelé SUMA. Quand il a sollicité la prise en charge financière du projet, la facture de l'hôpital à l'appui, sa demande a été rejetée.

En mars 2005, un autre réfugié (Mahamat Adigueye) a hospitalisé (une opération chirurgicale) aussi son enfant dans un des hôpitaux privés de la place. Sa demande de prise en charge a été accordée. Son enfant fut pris intégralement en charge sur le plan financier par le projet.

Ayant constaté la prise en charge accordée à l'enfant de Mahamat Adigueye hospitalisé dans une structure privée comme l'a été sa femme, Mamadou Ly s'est plaint. Il saisit aussitôt le point focal pour demander que les frais qu'il a payés pour l'hospitalisation de sa femme lui soient remboursés par le projet.

Aussitôt saisis, nous avons mené des investigations au près des responsables des services ayant en charge le volet médical, en l'occurrence le médecin du projet et son collaborateur. Les éléments de réponse donnés indiquent que le réfugié qui a évacué sa femme à l'hôpital SUMA n'avait pas respecté la procédure en cours. Sa femme aurait pu être évacuée et traitée dans un hôpital public. Il a préféré l'évacuer dans une structure privée extrêmement chère, sans l'avis du médecin du projet qui est nécessaire dans de telles situations.

Concernant l'autre réfugié, aucun hôpital public de la place n'est à mesure de prendre en charge l'opération chirurgicale de l'enfant. Un seul hôpital privé de la place est spécialisé pour ce type d'opération. Pour sauver la vie de l'enfant, le médecin du projet, a pris la décision de l'envoyer dans cette structure privée.

Au terme de nos investigations, nous avons saisi aussitôt le directeur général de l'OFADDEC afin qu'il soit rappelé à tous les chefs de services, voire tout le personnel, le principe d'équité qui doit toujours prévaloir dans le traitement des réfugiés.

*B) Plainte du Réfugié Abou Shérif candidat à une bourse d'études.*

Abou Shérif, à l'instar des jeunes étudiants réfugiés, a déposé une demande de bourse d'études pour préparer le DESS (Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures Spécialisées) en finance à l'université de Dakar. La commission des bourses qui s'est réunie en novembre 2004, a octroyé les bourses sur la base des critères de sélection bien définis. La demande de Abou Shérif a reçu une suite négative.

Abou Shérif conteste la décision de la commission. Il saisit alors le directeur général de l'OFADDEC pour se plaindre, et demande de réexaminer son dossier. Des investigations ont alors été menées auprès de la commission des bourses. Le dossier de candidature de Abou Shérif a été vérifié et l'ensemble des critères de sélection retenus cette année pour l'octroi des bourses passés en revue. D'autre part, des vérifications ont été menées aussi au niveau de la Commission Nationale d'Éligibilité (CNE) au Statut de réfugié.

Il s'est avéré que la commission a retenu comme âge-limite 28 ans au 31 décembre 2004 pour tout candidat. Abou Shérif est né en 1970. Au 31 décembre 2004, il a 34 ans. Les vérifications faites au niveau de l'université de Dakar ont montré que Abou Shérif n'a pas obtenu la maîtrise en sciences juridiques comme il le prétend. Par conséquent son inscription au DESS finance n'est pas possible.

A la suite de cette plainte, les mesures suivantes ont été prises :

- Diffuser largement les critères d'attribution des bourses.
- Informer les réfugiés de la procédure de demande de bourses
- Publier les documents qui composent le dossier de candidature.

Des dépliants portant toutes ces informations sont multipliés et distribués aux réfugiés à Dakar.

Juillet 2007

## Oxfam GB

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### Accountability to people affected by crisis – humanitarian accountability (HA)

#### Programme

- Supported programmes in Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia to implement HA initiatives
- Solicited beneficiaries views re levels of accountability achieved by Oxfam GB (OGB) and partners in Southern Africa and South India responses
- Trialled Mango Accountability checklist
- Trialled feedback mechanisms, learnt some interesting lessons
- Trained as Building Safer Organisations (BSO) investigators and trainers, handled 10+ investigations
- Wrote, briefed and received overwhelmingly positive support for proposal to Oxfam on how to improve accountability to humanitarian beneficiaries over the next two years

#### Successes and failures

- We have an agreed definition of HA
- In supported programmes key staff are able to articulate what they do to improve accountability and what their teams do
- We can measure accountability levels and beneficiaries can tell the difference (and tell us!)
- The need for a public information policy, a complaints policy and a Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) policy has been debated and won
- Reporting to IANGO/One World Trust Charter standards and using the format Global Reporting Initiative we will produce a Sustainability Report for November of this year that will be published alongside our Annual Report and Accounts
- Failures... have some difficulty conceiving of and instituting strong links between HA and other (MEL) initiatives

#### Internal initiatives

- policy mentioned above is being written and expects a smooth ride through council etc in the next financial and programme year
- a workplan, against the proposal and for two-year period in being elaborated
- a programme quality forum exists at both international level and humanitarian department level
- work on HA has had a leading role in overall programme accountability

- 2 HD staff members fully dedicated to HA and other advisory staff involved
- resources and budgets accordingly

### External initiatives

- BSO trainers – pioneering initiative to detect and action cases of SEA
- SCHR Peer Review steering group – a greater focus of organization on accountability
- HAP membership – continued focus and practical support for field programmes and a group of peers with whom to discuss practicalities of being more accountable
- Through the IWG we have had, and will have, strong links with Gate’s funded ECB work that has resulted in the Good Enough Guide amongst other initiatives focusing on strengthening the sector and it’s ability to be accountable to people affected by crisis
- Links with Mango, OWT, Bond etc

### Aim

Oxfam definition of accountability is as follows:

**Accountability to humanitarian beneficiaries means putting them at the heart of what we do and prioritising their needs above those of other stakeholders.**

**Which means:**

- **providing clear, appropriate and accessible information relevant to their situation, whether about their rights and entitlements, or our capacity to respond to their needs.**
- **ensuring our staff and partners do their work honestly and openly, involving beneficiary communities in decision-making that affects them and their lives.**
- **and opening ourselves up to both positive and negative feedback, committing to responding to complaints in a systematic and respectful way, and making changes accordingly.**

Work will happen at an organisational systemic level, at regional and country level and at an individual level. By working with at least one country/programme/project per region we aim to have reached a critical mass of people who, by the end of a two-year period will be able to articulate and demonstrate acct ways of working.

### Next 2 years

- most of the HAP benchmarks in chosen projects
- with particular emphasis on: two-way process of information sharing; improved staff attitudes and skills and appropriate feedback mechanisms (based on the complaints policy)
- greater organisational clarity and practical commitment/resources/workplans for HA and wider

## Save the Children UK

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As part of Save the Children's membership in HAP, and our commitment to the HAP accountability principles, we are trialling ways to increase our accountability to our prime beneficiaries – children. Across the world a number of methods have been chosen – using children's feedback committees in Zimbabwe, and using children as trainers and community motivators in Vietnam, for example. However to date, children had not been asked to evaluate Save the Children's programmes using their own chosen tools and indicators. We believe this is important in order to increase the genuine participation of and communication with beneficiaries in Save the Children's programming evaluation, monitoring and future planning.

On 27 May 2006, an earthquake measuring 6.2 on the Richter scale struck central Java in Indonesia, and caused extensive loss of life and damage. Over 2.7 million people were affected by the earthquake. Save the Children's emergency response programme supported 30,000 children from the earthquake affected areas to have access to adequate shelter, protection and emergency education.

As part of the evaluation process for this emergency response, the Jogjakarta programme developed a new pilot process where children are asked to identify what *they* think is a good emergency response programme. Children themselves, ages 9-14, chose the indicators of success. The children themselves have also been tasked to gather information from younger children – and will need to be creative in how this is done.

The initial training modules were developed, explaining the purpose of the review and the role of the children. Meetings were held with the parents as well. As the process continues, the meetings with children will lead to them developing their own indicators and tools, practicing interviewing techniques, and role play.

The emphasis of the work is on the children having fun – and also using tools that are easy for other children to understand; therefore the process will probably include a number of visual tools. At the time of writing the review is still underway (it is expected to take some 4-5 months in total). Once the data has been collected and analysed by the children, an exhibition of their findings will be held – sometime in the summer of 2007.

This is just one example of how Save the Children is working with creative methods to improve the participation of beneficiaries in programme evaluation; we see this as a very important component of accountability, coupled with better monitoring, lessons-learned exercises including staff and beneficiaries, external evaluations, and peer reviews conducted with other agencies.

## Tearfund

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Tearfund has made positive progress during 2006 in the promotion and implementation of accountability within the organisation.

### Promotion within the Organisation

By the end of 2006 Tearfund was approaching the end of a period of strategic review, which had sought to articulate a new 10 year vision for Tearfund and identify the type of organisation that will be required to deliver this vision. The review process was managed by an Organisation and Culture Review (OCR) team. The team identified a number of corporate priorities where action was required in order to align the organisation to the new vision. One of these priority projects identified has been increasing Beneficiary Accountability.

Tearfund first drew up its Accountability Work Plan (AWP) in September 2004 and has been updating it periodically since that time. With the establishment of the OCR Beneficiary Accountability project, the earlier actions and commitments from the AWP have been incorporated into the OCR project action plan, along with the HAP Standard benchmarks, requirements and indicators that are now available with the publishing of the HAP 2007 Standard.

Having Beneficiary Accountability understood as a corporate priority and identified at the heart of Tearfund's strategic planning process has had a significant impact on the speed with which commitments are being acted upon. Using the format of an action plan for the OCR project has also been helpful, in identifying the specific actions that are required to increase beneficiary accountability, the owners of each action and timeframes involved.

### Field Implementation

Using examples from Darfur (Tearfund Operational teams) and Zimbabwe (Tearfund Partners) what follows are some brief examples of accountability implementation, progress made, challenges and lessons learnt.

*Progress made* – In Darfur there is an increased emphasis on accountability at the field level, through reinforcement in Tearfund senior staff management meetings, in-house training, and local staff training, all leading to an increased commitment within the programme. The project locations in Darfur are seeking to have dedicated accountability staff within the teams and there has been increasing emphasis on making information on the organisation and programme publicly available. This has also been seen to have a positive impact on security management, in an operating environment where community acceptance is critical. In Zimbabwe Tearfund saw immediate buy in to accountability principles from a partner who said, “accountability just made sense”.

The accountability plan provided a framework for articulating to a partner what accountability could look like in practice.

## Challenges Encountered

The Darfur programme has been operational since 2004 and being an ongoing programme it is more difficult to retrofit accountability onto existing work. This can make it more difficult for accountability to be seen and understood as “how we do business”, without it being implemented from the onset of a programme.

Tearfund in Darfur also found it difficult to recruit accountability staff with the right skill set. Additionally in some of the project sites a mindset has needed to be overcome where staff have understood accountability as an externally imposed requirement, rather than as an internal priority; a core commitment for Tearfund.

In Zimbabwe the project target group is vulnerable children, although the project works through their guardians. Further work is required to ensure that feedback from children can reach the project team without it being filtered by their carers.

## Lessons Learnt

- Having dedicated staff focusing on accountability at the project team level makes a significant difference to the impact and effectiveness of accountability commitments.
- Start by sensitising staff and follow this quickly by implementation of a selected number of the principles – don’t feel obliged to address all principles at once.
- Prepare an accountability action plan for each project that outworks the higher level work plan.
- Accountability can and will have positive impacts beyond just beneficiaries feeling included and listened to. In the case of the Zimbabwe project it resulted in the de-politicisation of food distributions at a time when this was a major issue.

## Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children

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### June 2005 – May 2007

The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (Women's Commission) remains committed to working with Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP). Our commitment to accountability for beneficiaries is steadfast.

The Women's Commission HAP work plan goal, *to integrate humanitarian accountability into all Women's Commission work on behalf of women, children and adolescents affected by armed conflict and persecution* was addressed in its organizational strategic planning process initiated in April 2006. One of the three objectives for the strategic planning process was to review the Women's Commission's relationship with refugee and displaced women and children, how best to engage them in our work, to be accountable to them, and to support their own activities as advocates and activists. To address this objective the following ten time-bound activities were identified for implementation from 2007-2009 and the progress is recorded for 2007 activities.

1. The Women's Commission should strengthen its efforts to engage displaced women and youth in all stages of its work, including in its advocacy in the US and abroad, with both decision-makers and the media. In providing opportunities to speak, we should help refugees and IDPs improve their public speaking skills, hone their advocacy messages, and develop their own advocacy strategies. (FY2007) *The Women's Commission provided funding and presentation assistance for eight refugees, four of them youth, to advocate in major fora in the United States. Three refugees were from Burma living in Thailand and gave presentations about reproductive health at the Global Health Council Annual meeting in May 2006, one refugee board member gave a presentation on a panel at the Commission on the Status of Women in New York in March 2007 and four refugees gave presentations at the Women's Commission annual luncheon in New York in May 2007. In addition, the Women's Commission hosted a reception for the honorees at which we showed films of their work; made a \$5,000 grant to each honoree's organization; arranged meetings for honorees with potential donors and others; and provided them with information on potential funding sources.*
2. The Women's Commission will consider an annual field delegation whose purpose would be open-ended consultation with refugees and IDPs, and with field-based UN and NGO staff, without pre-determined programmatic objectives. (FY2008)
3. While on field missions, program staff should identify local community activists and leaders as key contacts for engagement, while ensuring that these leaders and activists truly represent their communities. (FY2007) *During the Women's*

*Commission's reproductive health assessment undertaken in February 2007, several IDP representatives were identified to send the assessment reports to.*

4. The Women's Commission will develop materials specifically for a refugee audience describing our organization and programs, and disseminate these materials on field visits. (FY2007) *The Women's Commission developed a new fact sheet about its mission and work specifically for beneficiary populations. The fact sheet was field-tested during the Uganda assessment in February 2007 and continues to be field-tested at this time.*
5. All program plans will include measures for input and feedback from the target, beneficiary community. The Women's Commission will strive to provide continued feedback on the progress of our work to refugees and IDPs with whom we meet during visits to the field. (FY2007) *The Women's Commission's program work plans now include indicators for providing input and feedback from the beneficiary community. The Women's Commission also developed a beneficiary version of its field assessment report, for the first time, following the February 2007 Uganda assessment.*
6. The Women's Commission will consider approaches that might enable us to have more sustained contact with a limited number of refugee and IDP groups in the field. Such sustained contact could provide useful feedback on our publications and our work, serve as an accountability mechanism, and provide additional information to us on conditions on the ground. (FY2008)
7. The Women's Commission will establish an internal working group to facilitate accountability to beneficiaries and develop ethical guidelines for our research in the field. (FY2007) *The Women's Commission established an internal working group in 2006 that has met several times to address beneficiary accountability and to develop ethical guidelines for field research. The Women's Commission drafted the document, Ethical Guidelines for Media, Film, Photography and Interviews in January 2007 and field-tested the guidelines with board members during its board delegation to Uganda in February 2007.*
8. The Women's Commission will continue to recruit refugee board members, aiming to recruit one such board member a year. (FY2007) *One refugee board member was recruited in 2007.*
9. The Women's Commission will strengthen our attempts to ensure the structured and active participation of refugees and IDPs in all phases of the work of other humanitarian actors through our production of guidelines, training manuals and tools for assessment, implementation and evaluation, and through our continuous engagement with UNHCR, UNOCHA, and major International NGOs. The Women's Commission will also advocate with donors that they require such

structured and active participation in the programs they support, and increase their direct support of programs run by refugees and IDPs themselves. (FY2007) *Funding for the participation of two displaced population representatives in a high-level working group was received from one donor in 2007.*

10. The Women's Commission will implement and evaluate two initiatives designed to support refugees and IDPs in their own work as advocates and activist: (i) the expansion of our database on funding, capacity building, and fellowship opportunities; and (ii) the development of linkages with two women-focused organizations with greater capacity to assist at the local level than the Women's Commission (e.g., Women for Women, the Global Fund for Women). (FY2007) *The Women's Commission initiated the development of a resource document to provide to refugees and IDPs looking for funding support as advocates and activist themselves. In addition, the Women's Commission has been in communication with Women for Women and the Global Fund for Women and reviewed refugee proposals for the latter.*
11. The Women's Commission has not progressed from previous reports on the second objective, *Ensure Women's Commission partnership agreements (local and international NGOs) comply with accountability standards* primarily because the Women's Commission is working to first ensure its own integration of humanitarian accountability in its work before requiring partners to comply with HAP principles and standards.

## World Vision International

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During 2006, World Vision's unit for Accountability in Humanitarian work, H-Account took significant steps forward. This included completing a business plan that established the theoretical framework for greater organizational accountability, matched this with key organizational priorities, and laid out a 10-year strategy. The next step was to develop detailed operational plans that outline how World Vision will increase accountability to both beneficiaries and standards in emergencies during the next five years. These documents also establish organizational commitment and outline how World Vision will work in close coordination with external initiatives including the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership. This commitment could be seen in both Darfur and Pakistan where H-Account supported work by field operations to support HAP fieldwork and increase beneficiary engagement with our programmes. In Pakistan, this included hosting HAP-I's field presence for the whole year.

World Vision is committed to being accountable to external stakeholders and in 2006 found external scrutiny a welcome check on how we are doing. The One World Trust featured World Vision as one of 30 global organizations in their accountability report, and this was a useful compliment to HAP-I's work on standards and benchmarks, which has a more operational focus. World Vision assisted HAP's work further through the provision of extensive field and technical feedback to the development of the HAP standard, field testing the draft standard and by committing to undergo a certification process in Sri Lanka in mid 2007. H-Account staff were also involved with other accountability initiatives and worked closely with the Emergency Capacity Building Project to develop an interagency description of accountability to beneficiaries at the field level (the basic elements) and then participated in the editing of a simple to use introduction to field level accountability for field workers called "The Good Enough Guide to Impact Measurement and Accountability". During this process it was very productive to also have HAP represented on the editorial team behind the guide so that ECB and HAP approaches could be made as complimentary as possible. The Good Enough Guide helps to operationalize key HAP principles, particularly those around communication and participation. As such it is a useful tool in working towards the HAP standard released in December 2006.

Over the course of the year, interest in field level accountability has been growing amongst World Vision field practitioners and this has been due to an internal awareness raising campaign as well as the growing profile of accountability in the external environment. During 2006, H-Account held trainings with programme specialists, field representatives and technical experts in global surge capacity mechanisms. In all of these trainings, the goal was to raise awareness of H-Account's strategy to promote accountability, share new tools and explain how initiatives like HAP can add value to our work in the field. For World Vision to be truly accountable, internal efforts to build

capability need to be combined well with strategic external engagement with initiatives such as SPHERE, HAP and ECB.

In 2006, World Vision was able to integrate a commitment to increased accountability with internal strategic and planning frameworks and to develop approaches that will increase the impact of this in more of our programmes. Pockets of good practice exist, notably in Darfur, Aceh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. HAP engagement at the field level has helped to strengthen these and to provide fresh insight. Progress is being made, but there is still much to be done so that these pockets of learning and good practice can spread out and become the norm in an increasing number of World Vision's field programmes. HAP's standard, its benchmarks, and its commitment to certification are important elements in helping to make this happen.

May 2007

# Appendices

## **APPENDIX 1**

### **HAP Survey 2007: Analysis Report**

Andrew Lawday

6 April 2007

#### **1. Survey**

**HAP sent out its second Humanitarian Accountability Survey in March 2007 and received 165 responses.**

- HAP designed, tested and distributed the HAP Accountability Survey 2007 using Survey Monkey software. (See questionnaire attached)
- The survey was sent to HAP's contact list of 1,865.
- The survey was open between 21 April and 6 March.
- A total of 165 responses were received.
- The survey comes a year after the first HAP Accountability Survey in March 2006.
- Compared to 2006, the survey received fewer responses: 165 compared to 320.
- Possible explanations: The survey was sent out only once in 2007; contacts felt put off by the more formal looking survey design; stakeholders felt saturated with accountability questions – or over-consulted by HAP; good will towards HAP was shrinking into a smaller group of 'supporters'?



## 2. Respondents

### **A significant majority (58%) of respondents worked for INGOs, followed by other humanitarian organisations.**

- The question was phrased as a prompt: 'I mostly work / consult for...' It allowed a single answer.
- Many responded: A total of 161/165 respondents answered. The question was under an 'optional' section that asked for information about respondents.
- INGOs were strongly represented: A large majority, more than half the respondents (57.8%), said they work/consult for international NGOs (93/161).
- Other agencies were represented: These included UN agencies (13.7% or 22/161), national NGOs (7.5% or 12/161), and research group/university (6.8% or 11/161).
- Governments were weakly represented: Only a few respondents were from donor governments (5% or 8/161), and none (0%) were from 'host' governments.
- A significant portion gave 'other' (9.3% or 15/93) as their response, and specified further (data is available).
- Most respondents worked for international NGOs and relief organisations, and few/none were disaster survivors; results were likely biased towards a positive view of humanitarian accountability.
- In 2006, the contact list was described as comprising 'mainly of individuals involved in humanitarian response and accountability' and as constituting a 'group of relatively well-informed observers.'

### **Most respondents were senior managers (33%), programme managers (28%) and policy advisers (21%).**


- The question was phrased as a prompt: 'my main function...' It allowed a single answer.
- Many responded: 159/165 answered. The question was under the optional section.
- Respondents were evenly split three ways between senior managers (33.3% or 53/159), programme managers (28.3% or 45/159), and policy/advisory (21.45 or 34/159).
- Very few were field practitioners (1.3% or 2/159).
- A minority listed "other" and specified further (15.7% or 25/159). Further data is available.

**'I mostly work/consult for...'****'my main function...'****More than two thirds of respondents lived in donor countries or aid headquarters; the rest lived mainly in disaster-affected countries.**

- The question was phrased as a prompt: 'my country of residence.'
- Many responded (159/165). The question was under an 'optional' heading.
- Respondents lived in 39 countries (states or territories) in 6 regions.
- By region, most respondents lived in Europe (90/159), the Americas (28/159), and the South Pacific (6/159).
- Fewer lived in Africa (16/159), Asia (16/159), and the Middle East (3/159).
- By country, most respondents lived in the UK (33), the USA (24), and Switzerland (24), followed by France (7), Australia (6), and Cambodia (5).

- Respondents lived in at least 17 disaster-affected countries: Kosovo, Serbia, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Jordan, and Palestine.

### Respondents by region




## 3. Views

### 3.1 Accountability trends: More than three quarters of respondents perceived that agencies were becoming more accountable to disaster survivors.

- The question was phrased as a prompt: ‘Agencies are becoming more accountable to disaster survivors.’ It allowed a yes or no answer.
- Many responded: A total of 157/165 respondents answered.
- A large majority (75.2% or 118/165) perceived that agencies were becoming more accountable to disaster survivors.
- A minority, about a quarter (24.8% or 39/165), perceived that agencies were NOT becoming more accountable to disaster survivors.
- The responses contrasted with 2006, when respondents ‘cited mild improvement’ for 2005 in practices of accountability to intended beneficiaries and predicted zero or little improvement during 2006.
- Respondents may have felt obliged to recognize with optimistic responses HAP’s efforts to improve humanitarian accountability during 2006-7.

### 'agencies are becoming more accountable to disaster survivors'




### 3.2 Humanitarian accountability in 2006 was perceived as 'low' to disaster survivors, 'medium-low' to host government authorities, 'medium' to private donors, and 'high' to official donors.

- Respondents were asked to 'rate the accountability of relief agencies to the following groups' (1-5 scale, 5=excellent).
- A total of 156/165 responded.
- **Accountability to disaster survivors was perceived as low.** Respondents rated accountability to disaster victims as lower than to other groups. Most respondents perceived it to be in the low (33%) or middle (32%) categories. More than half (55%) considered it to be in the low categories (1-2). Fewest viewed it as excellent (3%).
- **Accountability to host governments/authorities was perceived as medium-low.** Respondents generally rated accountability to host governments/authorities to be in the middle (42%) and low category (31%). Not many respondents perceived it as low (9%) or high (2%).
- **Accountability to private donors was seen as medium.** Respondents placed accountability to private donors to be in the middle (28%) to high (26%) categories. Answers were fairly evenly spread across the middle to high categories.
- **Accountability to official donors was seen as high.** Respondents rated accountability to official donors to be mainly in the high (53%) or excellent (23%). Few perceived it to be low (5%) or very low (1%).
- **Responses correlated closely to the 2006 Survey (of 2005):** in 2006, respondents reported varying levels of accountability depending upon the affected stakeholder group. A majority of respondents observed low levels of accountability to intended beneficiaries ('disaster survivors' in 2007); they also reported medium levels of accountability to host authorities and private donors, with high levels of accountability to official donors.

- **Responses lead to similar conclusions:** The great majority of respondents believed that intended beneficiaries experienced the greatest deficit in humanitarian accountability. Capacity to demand accountability therefore correlated directly with the relative power of stakeholders.

**Rating of humanitarian accountability by stakeholder group**




**3.3 Accountability in Practice**

**Most respondents perceived 'participation' to be the best way to provide accountability to disasters, while the other answers (5%-20%) were spread across all the options.**

- The question was phrased as a prompt: 'the best way to provide accountability to disaster survivors.'
- A total of 161/165 responded.
- Most respondents perceived that 'participation' (34% or 55/161) was the best way, followed by 'transparency' (20% or 33/161) and 'competent staff' (16% or 26/161).
- 'Continual improvement' (8% or 13/161) and 'management systems' (7% or 12/161) received equal levels of support as the best way.
- Fewest perceived 'complaints handling' to be the best way (5% or 8/161).
- A significant number (9% or 14/161) gave 'other' as their answer and specified further (data available).

### 'the best way to provide accountability to disaster survivors'



#### 3.4 Further comments.

**Most respondents in the 'further comments' section stated that a combination of methods was needed to provide accountability to disaster survivors.**

- The largest number of 'further comments' supported the view that a combination of the methods listed was needed to provide accountability to disaster survivors.
- A significant group also stressed the primary importance of participation, competent staff, transparency, management systems or continual improvement.
- In contrast, another group argued that levels of accountability varied widely between organisations and across contexts and, in some cases, therefore felt unable to answer the survey. One respondent suggested the need to build upon the humanitarian accountability successes.
- Other groups suggested that other actors should address accountability more effectively: donors, the UN, and national governments.

## **APPENDIX 2**

### **Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – International** *“making humanitarian action accountable to beneficiaries”*

Vision: HAP International’s vision is of a humanitarian system championing the rights and the dignity of its intended beneficiaries.

Mission: To make humanitarian action accountable to its intended beneficiaries through standard setting, self-regulation and compliance verification.

### **The 2006 Secretariat Workplan – Summary Status Report**<sup>25</sup>

#### **1. Building Our Programme: To research and develop the tools for the application and verification of compliance with the HAP Principles of Accountability and Quality Management Standards**

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<sup>25</sup> This plan is identical to the 2006-2007 Workplan (version 16 January 2006) but with the 2007 activities removed.

<sup>26</sup> Status at end of 2006: ✓ = completed; ± = partially completed; ☒ = cancelled; → = deferred to 2007.



Objectives	Key Activities	Dates	Lead	Status
<b>1.4 - Accreditation/Certification</b> To design and trial an accreditation/certification system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Purchase ISO 900 Standard and SGS NGO Benchmark</li> <li>■ Report on the applicability, relevance and appropriateness of ISO standards, the SGS NGO Benchmark, Social Audit 8000 and similar</li> <li>■ Present options to General Assembly &amp; Board (MTSP)</li> <li>■ Negotiate certification trials with 4 or more members</li> <li>■ Manage certification trials</li> <li>■ Develop accreditation links</li> </ul>	01/06	SH	✓
		02/06	SH	✓
		04/06	SH/NS	✓
		04/06 – 06/06	SH	±
		10/06 – 01/07	SH	±
		07/06 – 06/07	SH	✓→

## 2. Developing the Partnership: To strengthen and expand HAP's membership.

Objectives	Key Activities	Dates	Lead	Status
<b>2.1 - Accountability Workplans (AWPs)</b> To support the preparation, revision and monitoring of Accountability Workplans by members.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Provide AWP training for new members</li> <li>■ Support to members – visit each member agency at least once per year</li> <li>■ Monitor AWP reporting and implementation</li> <li>■ Convene annual AWP Peer Support Meeting</li> <li>■ Review and give feedback on members AWP annual reports</li> </ul>	Ongoing	ZC	✓
		Ongoing	ZC	±
		Ongoing	ZC	±
		11/06	ZC	☒
		Ongoing	ZC	±
<b>2.2 - Complaints Handling</b> To review and investigate complaints in line with the Complaints Against Member Agencies Procedure (12/03).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Prepare and disseminate Guideline(s) for complaints handling procedures</li> <li>■ Update Complaints Against Member Agencies Procedure</li> <li>■ Convene Complaints Review Committee and initiate investigations as necessary</li> </ul>	08/06	ZC	✓
		11/06	NS	→
		Ongoing	NS	N/A

Objectives	Key Activities	Dates	Lead	Status
<p><b>2.3 - Growth of Membership</b> To grow the membership of HAP to 25 members by mid 2007</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Review new membership applications and make recommendations to the HAP Board</li> <li>■ Run one accountability promotional event per year for prospective members — Dublin</li> </ul>	<p>Ongoing</p> <p>06/06</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>ZC</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>✓</p>
<p><b>2.4 - Advocacy</b> To promote the widest possible adoption of and support for the principles of accountability to humanitarian beneficiaries</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Representation at strategic humanitarian forums by secretariat staff and other key accountability advocates (board members, consultants etc)</li> <li>■ Produce bi-monthly newsletters and occasional briefings</li> <li>■ Prepare ToR for Annual Humanitarian Accountability Report consultancy</li> <li>■ Recruit Annual Report Consultant</li> <li>■ Complete 2005 Annual Report</li> <li>■ Appoint Communications Manager</li> <li>■ Launch Accountability/Quality Management Campaign</li> </ul>	<p>Ongoing</p> <p>Ongoing</p> <p>01/06 &amp; 01/07</p> <p>02/06 &amp; 02/07</p> <p>03/06 &amp; 03/07</p> <p>03/06</p> <p>12/06</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>DH/ZC</p> <p>NS</p> <p>NS</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>±</p> <p>✓</p> <p>✓</p> <p>✓</p> <p>✓</p> <p>±</p> <p>→</p>
<p><b>2.5 - Strategic Development (branding &amp; re-launching) of HAP</b> To improve our ability to communicate our vision, mission and programme</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Appoint Medium Term Strategic Planning Consultant.</li> <li>■ Consultation with CEOs and key stakeholders</li> <li>■ Present to the GA and Board Medium Term Strategic Plan</li> <li>■ Plan re-launching</li> <li>■ Re-launch</li> </ul>	<p>03/06</p> <p>01/06 - 04/06</p> <p>04/06</p> <p>08/06</p> <p>02/07</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>NS</p> <p>NS</p> <p>NS</p> <p>NS</p>	<p>✓</p> <p>✓</p> <p>✓</p> <p>☒</p> <p>☒</p>
<p><b>2.6 - Website development</b> To make the HAP website the most authoritative and interactive source of information and debate about humanitarian accountability on the internet</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Appoint Communications Manager</li> <li>■ Appoint consultant to work to re-design website.</li> </ul>	<p>02/06</p> <p>09/06</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>CM</p>	<p>±</p> <p>→</p>

Objectives	Key Activities	Dates	Lead	Status
<p><b>2.7 - Fund-raising &amp; donor reporting</b> To engage donor support for HAP's objectives and programme</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Meet donor reporting requirements</li> <li>■ Revise budget</li> <li>■ Arrange annual audit</li> <li>■ Prepare HAP evaluation TOR</li> <li>■ Manage HAP Evaluation</li> </ul>	<p>Ongoing 01/06 &amp; 12/06 02/06 &amp; 02/07 11/06 12/06</p>	<p>SA SA SA NS NS</p>	<p>✓ ✓ ✓ → →</p>
<p><b>2.8 - Management &amp; Governance</b> To ensure effective, efficient, transparent and accountable management of the organisation,</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Convene 3 Board Meetings                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>— Budget</li> <li>— Annual Report</li> <li>— Review</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ Convene 1 General Assembly per year</li> <li>■ Produce monthly and annual financial management reports</li> <li>■ Review HAP reward policy with support from Chair</li> </ul>	<p>01/06 04/06 10/06 04/06 Ongoing 09/06</p>	<p>SA SA SA SA SA SA</p>	<p>✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ →</p>

\*Staff Responsible for deliver or coordination of activity

- JB = Jennifer Birdsall - Researcher
- EC = Emmanuel Minari Congo - Accountability Field Coordinator – Pakistan
- ZC = Zia Choudhury - Membership Services Coordinator
- RG = Remedios Gorgonio (“Ting”) - Accountability Advisor – Aceh
- DH = Darren Hart - Communications and Administration Assistant (post ended March 2006)
- SH = Sheryl Haw - Standards Development Manager
- BL = Basil Lucima - Accountability Field Coordinator – Sudan
- SA = Sabine Arrobio - Office Manager
- NS = Nicholas Stockton - Executive Director
- CM = Communications Manager - post to be filled by April 2006

## APPENDIX 3

### Secretariat Expenditure Summary Report JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2006

ACTIVITIES	BUDGET 2006	EXPENDITURE	BALANCE	INCOME
<b>Objective 1.1 Research</b>				
Research & Communication Officer	104'000	100'694.74	3'305	
Commissioned research cost	30'000	-	30'000	
Workshop-field trial-documentation/publication	30'000	-	30'000	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 1.1</b>	<b>164'000</b>	<b>100'694.74</b>	<b>63'305</b>	
<b>Objective 1.2 Standards</b>				
Standards Development Manager	147'855	146'781.11	1'074	
Technical Consultant	34'700	-	34'700	
Workshop Reference group	150'780	123'463.77	27'316	
Workshop Editorial Committee	41'104	39'848.51	1'256	
Publication & Launch	28'400	7'789.22	20'611	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 1.2</b>	<b>402'839</b>	<b>317'882.61</b>	<b>84'957</b>	
<b>Objective 1.3. "New Emergencies"</b>				
New Emergencies Workshop	11'000	23'173.38	-12'173	
Field Support Operations				
Sudan	175'000	164'853.75	10'146	
Pakistan	133'894	173'669.18	-39'775	
Aceh	28'100	140.00	27'960	
Unplanned emergency , set up costs	48'000	-	48'000	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 1.3</b>	<b>395'994</b>	<b>361'836.31</b>	<b>34'158</b>	
<b>Objective 1.4 Accreditation/certification</b>				
Visit to agencies	9'500	-	9'500	
Accreditation/certification trials (CP support local initiatives)	10'000	-	10'000	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 1.4</b>	<b>19'500</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>19'500</b>	
<b>Objective 2.1 Accountability Workplan</b>				
Accountability Advisor	139'775	119'387.00	20'388	
Training Package	5'000	-	5'000	
Members Support & AWP Monitoring	13'000	11'657.00	1'343	
Peer Support Group Meeting	3'500	3'344.80	155	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 2.1</b>	<b>161'275</b>	<b>134'388.80</b>	<b>26'886</b>	
<b>Objective 2.2 Complaint Handling</b>				
Publication on Complaints Handling	5'000	-	5'000	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 2.2</b>	<b>5'000</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>5'000</b>	
<b>Objective 2.3 Growth of Membership</b>				
Accountability event	7'000	670.69	6'329	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 2.3</b>	<b>7'000</b>	<b>670.69</b>	<b>6'329</b>	
<b>Objective 2.4 Advocacy</b>				
Representation at relevant humanitarian policy meetings	10'000	10'712.76	-713	
Printing- Publication	2'000	-	2'000	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 2.4</b>	<b>12'000</b>	<b>10'712.76</b>	<b>1'287</b>	
<b>Objective 2.5 Strategic Development (branding &amp; relaunch)</b>				
Consultant	45'000	42'000.00	3'000	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 2.5</b>	<b>45'000</b>	<b>42'000.00</b>	<b>3'000</b>	

ACTIVITIES	BUDGET 2006	EXPENDITURE	BALANCE	INCOME
<b>Objective 2.6 Website Development</b>				
Website consultant	4'000	444.58	3'555	
Website maintenance	3'000	-	3'000	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 2.6</b>	<b>7'000</b>	<b>444.58</b>	<b>6'555</b>	
<b>Objective 2.7 Fundraising &amp; donor reporting</b>				
Visit to donors	2'000	2'201.50	-202	
Publication Annual Report	22'000	21'230.31	770	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 2.7</b>	<b>24'000</b>	<b>23'431.81</b>	<b>568</b>	
<b>Objective 2.8 Management &amp; Overhead Cost</b>				
Director	252'000	247'194.97	4'805	
Coordinator/office Manager	151'275	107'786.65	43'488	
Admin & Communication Officer/ Communication manager	109'725	105'952.86	3'772	
IT Support officer	15'300	13'061.52	2'239	
Interns	4'000	1'170.00	2'830	
Representation & travel expenses	14'150	23'489.76	-9'340	
Recruitment & Relocation	25'000	14'216.20	10'784	
Staff Training	5'000	-	5'000	
Financial management (Dynadev Cost)	10'000	10'066.00	-66	
Audit and legal fees	6'000	7'605.85	-1'606	
Review/Evaluation	30'000	-	30'000	
Purchase of ISO / SGS standards	5'000	-	5'000	
Board Meetings Cost	17'000	17'158.91	-159	
General Assembly Cost	9'000	6'448.24	2'552	
Office rent & Charges	39'950	40'361.00	-411	
Office cleaning	5'000	2'917.90	2'082	
Phone/Fax	15'000	10'742.67	4'257	
Mail	1'000	1'755.21	-755	
Office Insurance	1'000	616.40	384	
Office supplies	7'000	1'839.49	5'161	
IT supplies + software	8'000	4'571.14	3'429	
Membership fees	2'000	1'375.89	624	
Translation	14'380	-	14'380	
Book purchase	3'000	1'066.75	1'933	
Taxes	-	2'818.30	-2'818	
Contingency, exchange loss	15'000	28'812.48	-13'813	
<b>TOTAL OBJECTIVE 2.8</b>	<b>764'780</b>	<b>651'028.19</b>	<b>113'752</b>	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2'008'388</b>	<b>1'643'090.49</b>	<b>365'298</b>	
Travel cost reductions	-36'985	-7'130.27	-29'855	
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>1'971'403</b>	<b>1'635'960.22</b>	<b>335'443</b>	
Contributions				1'689'235
Membership fees				136'336
Other operational revenues				1'749
<b>TOTAL INCOME</b>				<b>1'827'320</b>
<b>NET RESULT FOR THE YEAR 2006</b>				<b>191'360</b>

## APPENDIX 4

### Secretariat Audit report



Report of the auditors to the Board of

**Humanitarian Accountability  
Partnership International  
("HAP International")**

Financial statements for the financial year 2006,  
with comparative figures, including:

Balance sheet as of December 31, 2006  
Statement of financial activities  
for the financial year 2006, with comparative figures

Bureau Fiduciaire Lerch SA  
Nyon, April 11, 2007

**bfl**  
2, rue de la Gare  
1201 Yverdon  
2, rue de la Gare  
1201 Yverdon

Membre  
de l'Association Suisse  
des Fiduciaires

COMPTABLE  
REVISEUR  
FISCALISTE

Report of the auditors to the Board of  
**Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International ("HAP International")**

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Sirs,

As auditors of your association, we have audited the accounting records and the financial statements for the financial year 2006 with comparative figures.

These financial statements are the responsibility of the Board. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audit. We confirm that we meet Swiss legal requirements concerning professional qualification and independence.


Our audit was conducted in accordance with auditing standards promulgated by the profession in Switzerland, which require that an audit be planned and performed to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement. We have examined on a test basis evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. We have also assessed the accounting principles used, significant estimates made and the overall financial statements presentation. We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, the accounting records and financial statements comply with Swiss law and association statutes.

We recommend that the financial statements submitted to you be approved.

Nyon, Wednesday, April 11, 2007

Bureau Fiduciaire Lerch SA  
Tony Lerch  
Auditor in charge



Enclosures:  
Financial statements consisting of  
- Balance sheet  
- Statement of financial activities

## Enclosure 1

Balance sheet as of December 31, 2006  
with comparativ figures, in Swiss francs

HAP International  
Association located in Geneva

ASSETS	31.Dec.06	31.Dec.05
Petty cash	2'847	2'856
Bank accounts	565'424	323'628
<b>Liquidities</b>	<b>568'271</b>	<b>326'284</b>
Other short term assets	19'590	4'000
Prepaid expenses	40'358	18'240
<b>Current assets (included liquidities)</b>	<b>628'219</b>	<b>348'524</b>
Guarantee deposit	11'503	11'470
<b>Fixed assets</b>	<b>11'503</b>	<b>11'470</b>
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>639'722</b>	<b>359'994</b>
LIABILITIES	31.Dec.06	31.Dec.05
Account payable	88'379	10'768
Social charges & withholding tax payable	4'114	2'479
Accrued liabilities	16'518	7'396
<b>Short term debts</b>	<b>109'011</b>	<b>20'643</b>
Unrestricted funds	0	0
Restricted funds	135'000	135'000
<b>Funds capital</b>	<b>135'000</b>	<b>135'000</b>
Reserves	0	0
Retained earnings	204'351	119'024
Net result for the period	191'360	85'327
<b>Association capital</b>	<b>395'711</b>	<b>204'351</b>
<b>Total liabilities</b>	<b>639'722</b>	<b>359'994</b>

## Enclosure 2

Statement of financial activities for the period financial year 2006, in Swiss francs	HAP International Association located in Geneva	
Incoming resources	2006	2005
Membership fees	136'336	81'565
Donations	1'689'236	901'440
Costs paid by third parties	7'130	12'676
Other operational revenues	1'748	2'540
<b>Incoming resources</b>	<b>1'834'450</b>	<b>998'421</b>
Programmes direct costs	264'964	92'869
Salaries & social charges for programmes	451'540	351'427
Advocacy & communication	75'171	26'335
<b>Programme cost</b>	<b>791'675</b>	<b>470'631</b>
Salaries & social charges	475'166	408'506
Consultants fees	200'387	0
Recruitment & reloc. costs	14'216	5'646
Representation	12'105	13'143
<b>Staff cost</b>	<b>701'875</b>	<b>427'295</b>
Travel & related cost	11'385	0
Rental and charges	40'361	34'046
Office cleaning & maint.	2'918	6'530
GA, board and other meeting costs	23'607	11'766
Office & I.T. equipment & supplies	6'410	13'968
Membership fees, news papers, books	2'443	1'639
Insurances	616	616
Phone, fax & mail	12'498	14'575
Professional fees	17'672	12'274
Other expenses	3'743	2'935
<b>Administration cost including governance</b>	<b>121'653</b>	<b>98'349</b>
Bank charges & exchange diff.	25'069	-23'181
Taxes	2'818	0
<b>Financial costs &amp; taxes</b>	<b>27'887</b>	<b>-23'181</b>
<b>Total charges</b>	<b>1'643'090</b>	<b>973'094</b>
<b>Net incoming resources</b>	<b>191'360</b>	<b>25'327</b>
J. Restricted funds	0	60'000
<b>Net result for the period</b>	<b>191'360</b>	<b>85'327</b>

## Enclosure 3

Statement of financial activities for the period  
financial year 2005, in Swiss francsHAP International  
Association located in Geneva1. Detail of incoming resources 2005 vs 2006

	2006	2005
<b>MEMBERSHIP FEES*</b>		
CAFOD	8'139	7'232
Care International	18'797	16'136
Christians Aid	16'749	-
Danish Refugee Council	11'376	5'446
Medair	3'459	1'672
Norwegian Refugee Council	9'283	6'261
Oxfam GB	18'719	15'625
Save the Children	16'917	-
Tearfund	9'590	7'848
World Vision International	18'797	16'136
Other	4'510	5'209
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>136'336</b>	<b>81'565</b>
<b>DONORS CONTRIBUTIONS</b>		
Austrian council for int. Dev.	135'990	-
DFID	414'783	146'550
Care International	108'078	-
Danida	261'181	-
Ireland MFA	124'345	-
Ford Foundation	122'600	120'000
Ireland MFA	-	106'995
Netherlands MFA	155'000	155'000
Oxfam GB	121'000	100'000
SIDA	124'943	125'855
Swiss DC	5'000	45'000
World Vision	75'812	38'100
Tear fund	20'205	-
CAFOD	20'299	-
Others	-	64'140
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1'689'235</b>	<b>901'440</b>
<b>OTHERS</b>		
Cost paid by third parties	7'130	12'876
Other operational revenues	1'749	2'540
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>8'879</b>	<b>15'416</b>
<b>Total incoming resources</b>	<b>1'834'450</b>	<b>998'421</b>

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